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ABSTRACT
The assaults on Fallujah by the United States military in April and November of 2004
involved the use of white phosphorus. White phosphorus has extremely damaging effects
on the health of victims, including severe burns and irritation of the respiratory system.
This article examines whether the use of white phosphorus was a violation of the
Chemical Weapons Convention, Protocol III to the Convention on Conventional
Weapons and international humanitarian law. It concludes that the use of white
phosphorus was illegal because it is arguably a chemical weapon, riot control agent, or
incendiary weapon. Furthermore, the methods and means of its use in Fallujah violated
the laws of war.
I. INTRODUCTION
"If we fight a war and win it with H-bombs, what history will
remember is not the ideals we were fighting for but the methods we
used to accomplish them."
- Hans A. Bethe
l
As this quotation by Nobel Prize winner Hans A. Bethe suggests, methods and
means of warfare have long-lasting effects on a war's legacy. Although using certain
weapons and tactics may achieve some level of military success, their use must be
tempered with humanitarian principles. Throughout most of the Iraq war, the media has
glossed over the impact and legality of weapons and tactics used by Coalition forces.
One issue that deserved wider public discussion is the use of certain controversial
weaponry by the US military during the Fallujah assaults of 2004, and in particular the
use of white phosphorus. Although a number of news outlets described it as a chemical
weapon, little detailed discussion of its legal status was undertaken. This paper aims to
examine whether the use of white phosphorus was a violation of international law. Part
One will outline the background to the US assault in Fallujah as well as the various
allegations of white phosphorus use. Part Two will discuss how the alleged use fits into
the legal framework banning chemical weapons use. Part Three will discuss whether the
use of white phosphorus could also be considered a breach of the various rules governing
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incendiary weapons use. Regardless of their legality, the use of weapons such as white
phosphorus was a flawed strategy that could only further stiffen the resolve of those
opposing the Coalition's presence in Iraq.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Fallujah City
Lying approximately forty miles west of Baghdad, Fallujah is situated in the heart
of what has been coined the "Sunni Triangle," a triangular shaped area lying to the north
and west of Baghdad. The Triangle stretches from Baghdad in the east, to Tikrit 2 in the
north, and to Ramadi in the west. Contained within this Triangle are the towns of Samara
and Fallujah.3 As its name suggests, it is inhabited predominantly by Sunni Muslims, the
ethnic group of former Iraqi President Saddam Hussein. This area has suffered
widespread violence since the 2003 invasion due to high insurgent activity. During 2003
and 2004, it was described as Iraq's "most volatile region, a hotbed for opposition against
the US led occupation, '4 and a "dangerous ground for US soldiers."
5
Fallujah's lawlessness became evident on March 31, 2004, when four private US
military contractors from the security firm Blackwater USA were dragged from their
vehicles, their bodies mutilated, set on fire, and hung from a bridge. Within days,
beginning on April 4, 2004, Operation Vigilant Resolve was launched, featuring 1200 US
Marines, backed by two Iraqi Security Force Battalions. Over the course of a week, this
operation swept through a number of cities in the region aiming to quell the violence and
regain control, with particular focus placed on ridding Fallujah of the insurgents. With
the city sealed and a night-time curfew imposed, the coalition forces met fierce urban
resistance, requiring dangerous house-to-house searches. 6 In total, approximately 600
Iraqis were reported dead,7 and a large number of high value targets were apprehended. 8
By April 9, the United States announced a unilateral suspension of fighting. By the end of
April, after intense international pressure to end the siege, 9 an agreement was reached
whereby the local population would keep the resistance fighters out of the city. The
Fallujah Protection Army, led by former Revolutionary Guard Brigade Commander and
2 Tikrit, the home-town of Saddam Hussein, is infamous for being a stronghold of regime die-hards,
powerful tribes and senior Baath Party members. See Ann Scott Tyson, Iraq's Restive 'Sunni Triangle,'
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Sept. 24, 2003, at I.
3 A Success, at Last, ECONOMIST, Oct. 9, 2004, at 63.
4 Iraq's 'Sunni Triangle' Scene of New Deadly Attacks, CNN, Jan. 22, 2004, available at
http://edition.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/meast/0 1/22/sprj.nirq.main/.
5 Sunni Triangle Dangerous Ground for U.S. Soldiers, CBC NEWS (Can.), Sept. 19, 2003, available at
http://www.cbc.ca/story/news/national/2003/09/1 9/sunni triangle030919.html.
6 Jose E. Guillen & Colin Wyers, Marines Take the Fight to the Streets, MARINE CORPS NEWS, April 7,
2004, available at http://www.usmc.mil/marinelink/mcn2000.nsf/news (search "Marines Take the Fight to
the Streets"; then follow "April 7, 2004" hyperlink).
7 US Seeks End to Falluja Bloodshed, BBC NEWS, April 12, 2004, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/
world/middle east/3618559.stm.
8 News Release, Headquarters United States Central Command, Operation Vigilant Resolve Nets High
Value Targets (Apr. 7, 2004) available at http://www.centcom.mil/sites/uscentcoml /Lists/
Press%20Releases/DispForm.aspx?ID= 1211.
9 Bassem Mroue, US Marines Begin Falluja Pullout, THE INDEP. (U.K. Online Edition), Apr. 30, 2004,
available at http://news.independent.co.uk/world/middle-east/article58365.ece.
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current Iraqi force General Jasim Mohamed Saleh, was established to maintain peace.
The force of approximately 1100 would operate independently of the US military.
0
Despite the announcement of a ceasefire in May, skirmishes continued for the following
months.
In October 2004, the violence in Fallujah re-escalated, and it became clear that the
city had fallen back into the hands of the insurgency. In response, on November 8, 2004,
Operation al-Fajr ("Dawn" in Arabic) was executed.' This involved a force of 10,000
to 12,000 US Marines, supported by Iraqi troops, 12 with the United States and the Iraqi
Interim Government authorizing the assault.' 3  Iraqi Prime Minister Allawi gave his
authorization largely as a result of the failed negotiations between the Government and
the Fallujah representatives to eject the foreign fighters suspected in the city. One such
insurgent believed to be present was Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the infamous leader of Al-
Qaeda in Iraq, In the lead-up to the assault, the US forces encircled the city and warned
the Fallujah residents of the impending attack, strongly urging them to leave. US
officials believe that of the 300,000 citizens, 70 to 90 percent fled, seeking refuge in
neighbouring towns, with a force of 2000 to 3000 insurgents remaining behind. 14 US
General George Casey later acknowledged that al-Zarqawi fled by November 9th. 5 In
the first stage of the assault, the Marines took control of strategic bridges and a hospital
on the western side of the town. By November 15th, the town was largely under US
control except for the southern Shuhada District, in which fierce fighting remained.
Upon securing a part of the city, the US military turned it over to Iraqi forces. During the
assault, important discoveries were made, such as large arms caches and heavily fortified
underground bunkers connected through a network of tunnels. During the assault, which
lasted until late January 2005, the US forces suffered 71 fatalities'
6 and 275 injuries.17
Between 1200 and 1600 insurgents were reported killed, as well as 2000 civilians.' 8 It
was during this campaign that the allegations of white phosphorus use by Coalition forces
emerged.
B. Allegations
The following is a summary of the various accounts regarding white phosphorus
use by US Marines.
The first report regarding Operation Vigilant Resolve of April 2004 was written
by embedded journalist Darrin Mortenson and published on April 10, 2004. He wrote,
"Bogert is a mortar team leader who directed his men to fire round after round of high
10Id.
1 "Originally known as 'Operation Phantom Fury'.
12 Approximately 2000 Iraqi troops were expected, however US General George Casey acknowledged that
an unknown number did not show up. See GlobalSecurity.org, Operation al-Fajr (Dawn)/Operation
Phantom Fury [Fallujah], http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/oif-phantom-fury-fallujah.htm.
13 News Release, Headquarters United States Central Command, Fallujah Operations Update, (Nov. 9,
2004) http://www.centcom.mil/sites/uscentcom I/Lists/Press%20Releases/DispForm.aspx?ID= 1703.
14 GlobalSecurity.org, supra note 12.
15 Id.
16 US Death Toll in Fallujah Reaches 71, ABC NEWS ONLINE (Austl.), Dec. 2, 2004, available at
http://www.abc.net.au/news/newsitems/200412/s 1256321 .htm.
' GlobalSecurity.org, supra note 12.
'8 ABC NEWS ONLINE, supra note 16.
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explosives and white phosphorus charges into the city Friday and Saturday, never
knowing what the targets were or what damage the resulting explosions caused." 9
Under a sub-heading entitled "Shake 'n' bake" he continued:
'Gun up!' Milikin yelled when they finished a few seconds later, grabbing a
white phosphorus round from a nearby ammo can and holding it over the
tube.
'Fire!' Bogert yelled, as Milikin dropped it.
The boom kicked dust around the put as they ran through the drill again and
again, sending a mixture of burning white phosphorus and high explosives
they call 'shake 'n' bake' into a cluster of buildings where insurgents have
been spotted all week.
They say they have never seen what they've hit, nor did they talk about it as
they dusted off their breakfast and continued their hilarious routine of
personal insults and name-calling.
20
In an email correspondence with The Independent, the same reporter confirmed,
"[d]uring the fight I was describing in my article, WP mortar rounds were used to create a
fire in a palm grove and a cluster of concrete buildings that were used as cover by Iraqi
snipers and teams that fired heavy machine guns at US choppers.
21
A further account of the Fallujah assault is detailed in a March-April 2005 issue of
the journal, Field Artillery. This report, written not by journalists but by three US
artillerymen, discusses their view of the operation from a tactical perspective. The
following passages are under the subheading "Munitions":
WP proved to be an effective and versatile munition. We used it for
screening missions at two breeches and, later in the fight, as a potent
psychological weapon against the insurgents in trench lines and spider holes
when we could not get effects on them with [high explosive rounds]. We
fired 'shake and bake' missions at the insurgents, using WP to flush them
out and [high explosive rounds] to take them out....
We could have used [hexachloroethane zinc smoke (HC) and precision-
guided munitions]. We used improved WP for screening missions when HC
'9 Damn Mortenson, Violence subsides for Marines in Fallujah, N. COUNTY TIMES (Escondido, Cal.), Apr.
10, 2004, at A 1.
20 Id.
21 Andrew Buncombe & Solomon Hughes, The Fog of War: White Phosphorus, Fallujah and Some
Burning Questions, THE INDEP. (U.K. Online Edition), Nov. 15, 2005, available at
http://news.independent.co.uk/world/americas/article3 27094.ece.
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smoke would have been more effective and saved our WP for lethal
missions.
On November 10, 2004, The Washington Post reported: "Some artillery guns fired
white phosphorous rounds that create a screen of fire that cannot be extinguished with
water. Insurgents reported being attacked with a substance that melted their skin, a
reaction consistent with white phosphorous bums." 23 In the same report, a physician at a
regional hospital is quoted as saying the corpses of the insurgents "were burned and some
corpses were melted.,
2 4
On November 8, 2005, the Italian state television network, RAI, aired the
documentary Fallujah: The Hidden Massacre, by Sigfrido Ranucci, which documented
the use of white phosphorus during the November 2004 Fallujah assault. In the
documentary, Mohammad Tareq, a human rights campaigner, reported that many victims
suffered serious bums. He claimed that the clothes of some of the victims appeared to be
intact even though their bodies were badly burned. The documentary alleges that
civilians, including women and children, had been killed through white phosphorus
attacks and includes images of these bodies. Critics of this film claim that such reports
are inconsistent with the actual effects of white phosphorus use, as it would have also
burned the victims' clothes. 25 The bodies from the RAI film could also have had such an
26appearance from exposure to the elements. As such, the evidence provided by the
documentary was not entirely convincing, and consequently will not be heavily weighted
in the analysis below.
In the RAI documentary, a former US Marine who fought in Fallujah during
November 2004 commented about white phosphorus use:
I heard the order to pay attention because they were going to use white
phosphorus on Fallujah. In military jargon it's known as "Willy Pete" ....
Phosphorus bums bodies, in fact it melts the flesh all the way down to the
bone .... I saw the burned bodies of women and children.
27
An unembedded Iraqi journalist, Dahr Jamail, who had been collecting testimony
from Fallujah's refugees, spoke to a doctor who remained in the city to help people and
who encountered numerous reports of civilians suffering unusual burns.28 The doctor
said he "treated people who had their skin melted., 29 A resident also told Jamail that the
United States had used "weird bombs that put up smoke like a mushroom cloud" and that
22 James T. Cobb, Christopher A. LaCour & William H. Hight, TF 2-2 in FSE AAR: Indirect Fires in the
Battle of Fallujah, FIELD ARTILLERY, March-April, 2005, at 23.
23 Jackie Spinner, Karl Vick & Omar Fekeiki, US Forces Battle into Heart of Fallujah, WASH. POST, Nov.
10, 2004, at AO1.
24 id.
25 Buncombe & Hughes, supra note 21.
26 Id.
2' Fallujah: The Hidden Massacre (RAI network broadcast Nov. 8, 2005) (Italy) available at
http://www.rainews24.rai.it/ran24/inchiesta/video/fallujahlNG.wmv.
28 Buncombe & Hughes, supra note 21.
29 Id.
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he watched "pieces of these bombs explode into large fires that continued to bum on the
skin even after people dumped water on the bums."
3
The response by the US government changed as the story gathered media
momentum. The Wall Street Journal quoted Lieutenant General Walter Buchanan III,
commander of the US Central Command Air Forces, as saying that white phosphorus "is
purely used as a marking round, not a weapon." 3 1 The US Embassy in Rome issued
similar statements which said, "to maintain that US forces have been using [white
phosphorus] against human targets.. is simply mistaken. 3 2 In addition, the US
Ambassador in London, Robert Tuttle, wrote to The Independent claiming that white
phosphorus was only used as an obscurant or else for marking targets. 33 He further
stated, "US forces participating in Operation Iraqi Freedom continue to use appropriate,
lawful and conventional weapons against legitimate targets. US forces do not use napalm
or phosphorus as weapons." 34  The US State Department's Counter Misinformation
Office provided a similar position, stating that the use of phosphorus shells is not
outlawed and that "US forces have used them very sparingly in Fallujah, for illuminating
purposes. They were fired into the air to illuminate enemy positions at night, not at
enemy fighters."
35
The United States revised its official position, however, on November 10, 2005,
with an acknowledgement that it had previously been incorrect. It stated:
White Phosphorus shells, which produce smoke, were used in Fallujah not
for illuminating but for screening purposes, i.e., obscuring troop movements
and according to an article, 'The Fight for Fallujah,' in the March-April
2005 issue of Field Artillery magazine, "as a potent psychological weapon
against the insurgents in trench lines and spider holes ..." The article states
that U.S. forces used white phosphorus rounds to flush out enemy fighters
so that they could then be killed with high explosive rounds.
36
On November 15, 2005, US Department of Defense Spokesperson Lieutenant-
Colonel Barry Venable confirmed to the BBC Radio 4PM program that white phosphorus
had indeed been used in Fallujah, however he denied that it was a chemical weapon.37
Lieutenant-Colonel Venable acknowledged that US forces could use white phosphorus in
order to flush out enemy troops from covered positions, saying, "[w]e use them primarily
as obscurants, for smokescreens or target marking in some cases. However it is an
incendiary weapon and may be used against enemy combatants. 36
30 
Id.
31 Darrin Mortenson, Official Waffling on White Phosphorus Fuels Debate Abroad, N. COUNTY TIMES
(Escondido, Cal.), Nov. 22, 2005, at Al.
32 Buncombe & Hughes, supra note 21
33 Id.
34 Id.
35 US Department of State, Did the U.S. Use "Illegal" Weapons in Fallujah? (updated Nov. 10, 2005),
available at http://usinfo.state.gov/media/Archive-Index/Illegal Weapons in Fallujah.html.
36 Id.
37 US Used White Phosphorus in Fallujah, BBC NEWS, Nov. 16, 2006, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/world/middle east/4440664.stm.
38 US Forces Used 'Chemical Weapon' in Iraq, THE INDEP. (U.K. Online Edition), Nov. 16, 2005,
available at http://news.independent.co.uk/world/americas/article327379.ece.
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In response to the question of whether white phosphorus was used as an offensive
weapon during the Fallujah assault, he confirmed, "[y]es, it was used as an incendiary
weapon against enemy combatants". 39 He continued:
When you have enemy forces that are in covered positions that your high
explosive artillery rounds are not having an impact on and you wish to get
them out of those positions, one technique is to fire a white phosphorus
round into the position because the combined effects of the fire and
smoke-and in some case the terror brought about the explosion on the
ground-will drive them out of the holes so that you can kill them with high
explosives.
40
In a report published November 22, 2005 in the North County Times, Colonel Dave
Lapan, top spokesman for the US Marine force in Iraq, maintained that white phosphorus
bombs could be unleashed on insurgents. In an email to reporter Darrin Mortenson, he
wrote, "[i]t is a conventional weapon used as an obscurant, for marking and illumination,
and may be used against enemy forces." 41 He continued, "[a]s with any weapon in our
inventory, we consider the target vulnerability and location, available munitions, risk to
the civilian population, and risk to friendly forces in determining how a target will be
attacked. 42
For the purposes of this article, the allegations above will be assumed as facts.
The following is a summary of assumptions upon which the legal analysis presented
below will be based:
" White phosphorus was used during the Fallujah assaults of 2004;
" White phosphorus was fired at suspected insurgent positions in order to flush
them out and kill them with high explosives;
" The marines were often not aware of who their targets were, or what damage was
being caused;
* Although non-combatants were not intentionally targeted, the difficulty in
distinguishing them from the combatant insurgents in the urban setting and from
controlling the indiscriminate effects of white phosphorus meant the non-
combatants suffered the effects of the attacks.
C. The Chemistry and Utility of White Phosphorus
White Phosphorus is a white (or yellow) solid with a garlic-like odor. It bums
very easily, catching fire at temperatures 10-15 degrees (0F) above room temperature. It
reacts very easily with oxygen, and as a result, is normally stored in water. The
substance does not occur naturally.
43
39 d.
40 id.
" Mortenson, supra note 31.
42 Id.
43 Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR), Public Health Statement for White
Phosphorus, Sept. 1997, available at http://www.atsdr.cdc.gov/toxprofiles/phs103.html.
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White phosphorus has a number of uses, including as a component in fertilizers,
food additives, cleaning compounds, and historically, in rat and roach poisons as well as
fireworks. Its most infamous use was in the manufacture of matches, which was
discontinued due to the severe side effects experienced by workers involved in the
manufacturing process.
The most useful military application for white phosphorus has been as a smoke
screen. When fired, either from mortar, artillery or grenade, it bums to produce a dense
white smoke. It has proven extremely useful as a screening agent to obscure troop
movements.
The US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) describes white phosphorus as
"extremely toxic to humans." 44 There are two ways in which white phosphorus can
impact human health: through particles and smoke. These will be discussed below.
As mentioned above, white phosphorus burns very easily. It is described as a
phyophobic material in that it is spontaneously flammable. Upon exposure to air, it
oxidizes to form phosphorus pentoxide. During this process, immense heat is released in
the form of a bright flame with dense white smoke. This process continues until all
phosphorus has oxidized or until it has been deprived of oxygen. When the burning
particles come into contact with exposed skin it can cause serious second and third degree
bums. It has rapid dermal penetration and results in deep and painful bums.45 Once the
particle is under the skin, it will bum until it is used up or deprived of oxygen. As such,
it can potentially bum right to the bone. Water may temporarily stop the burning, but
once the water has dried, and the white phosphorus particle again has access to oxygen, it
will reignite. Aside from death or serious bums, the victim of a white phosphorus bum
may also develop heart, liver and kidney damage as a result. 46 Inhalation of the white
phosphorus particles in the smoke can also cause serious damage to the lungs and
throat.47
White phosphorus smoke also possesses physiological effects on the human body.
White phosphorus smoke is composed of particles of phosphorus pentoxide, which reacts
with moisture in the air or body to form phosphoric acid. This acid, depending on its
concentration and the duration of exposure, may produce a variety of topically irritative
injuries to the victim. 49 Few studies have been conducted regarding the effects of
inhalation of white phosphorus smoke on human health. One study, by White and
Armstrong, took place in 1935 with a series of tests on human volunteers. ° Male
subjects were exposed to white phosphorus smoke at various concentrations. At the
lowest concentration (phosphorus pentoxide at 188mg/m 3) a five-minute exposure
resulted in half of the subjects reporting respiratory distress, coughing, congestion and
throat irritation. 51  At a higher concentration (phosphorus pentoxide at 514mg/m 3) a
44U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Phosphorus, Jan. 2000, available at http://www.epa.gov/
ttn/atw/hlthefwhitepho.html
45 GlobalSecurity.org, White Phosphorus, available at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/
munitions/wp.htm (last visited Mar. 19, 2007).
46ATSDR, supra note 43.
47 Id.
48 Id.
4 GIobalSecurity.org, supra note 45.
50 Toxicity of Military Smokes and Obscurants, in National Academy of Sciences, Vol. 2, 24 (1999).
51 Id.
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fifteen-minute exposure resulted in all subjects reporting tightness of chest, coughing,
nose irritation, and difficulty speaking. 52 In a further study, human volunteers were
exposed to phosphorous pentoxide for 3.5 minutes at a concentration of 592mg/m 3,
resulting in similar respiratory irritation, tightness of chest, coughing and difficulty
breathing. Following this experiment, the subjects refused to be exposed to a higher
concentration and thought it would be impossible, without more serious effects, to
perform any physical exercise or labor at that concentration. 53 In one such experiment
one of the subjects developed acute bronchitis.54 Importantly, all these effects were
reversible once the subject had left the exposure site.
55
In summary, white phosphorus is a volatile chemical which can cause serious
bums to victims. Under this usage, it could be potentially considered as an incendiary
weapon. When oxidized, it causes irritation to the respiratory system and mucus
membranes. Under this usage, it could potentially be used as a chemical weapon. The
following is an analysis of the legal regime governing such uses.
III. CHEMICAL WEAPONS
One of the principle allegations against white phosphorus use in Fallujah is that it
amounted to the use of a chemical weapon, thereby violating international treaty and
customary law. In order to ascertain the law, Article 38(1) of the Statute of the
International Court of Justice provides the sources which may be relied upon:
international conventions, international custom, general principles of law, judicial
decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists. 56 In light of this
provision, the following is an analysis of the law governing chemical weapon use and its
application to the Fallujah assault.
A. Prohibition of Chemical Weapons Use
International treaty and customary law clearly prohibit the use of chemical
weapons.
1. Treaty Law
The euphoria following the Cold War, coupled with the international
condemnation of the use of chemical weapons by Iraq in the Iran-Iraq War and in
Kurdistan, created fertile ground for the development of a comprehensive chemical
weapons treaty. In 1993, the Convention on the Development, Production, Stockpiling
and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction (also known as "Chemical
Weapons Convention" or "CWC") was concluded. It opened for signature on January
13, 1993, and entered into force on April 29, 1997, currently boasting 178 state parties,
including the United States, Russia, Iran, India, and Pakistan.
52 id.
53 id.
54 Id.
55 id.
56 1945 Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38(1).
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The CWC has a much broader scope of application than any previous regime.
Under Article 1, each state party undertakes "never under any circumstances ... to use
chemical weapons," 57 or "[t]o develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile or retain
chemical weapons, or transfer, directly or indirectly, chemical weapons to anyone.
'' 8
Likewise, a state may not "engage in any military preparations to use chemical
weapons," 59 or "assist, encourage or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any activity
prohibited to a State Party under this Convention." 60 States are also required to destroy
their current (and abandoned) chemical weapon stockpiles, and any current or former
production facilities.61 The phrase "never under any circumstances" emphasizes the
comprehensive and totally binding character of the prohibitions. 62 Geographically, the
prohibitions possess a universal character, applying to the activities of state parties
everywhere.63 The wording is such that it covers international and non-international
armed conflicts, regardless of whether the parties recognize each other.64 Furthermore,
state parties are required to adopt penal legislation to enforce the convention and extend
that legislation extraterritorially to all persons holding their nationality. 65 Reservations to
the articles of this treaty are not permitted.66
2. Customary International Law
Although early attempts to prohibit the use of chemical weapons date back to
1865, when an agreement between the French and German armies was recorded as stating
that "no side should use poisoned bullets, '67 no multilateral approach was subsequently
undertaken until the Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907. The 1899 Conference
included an adopted declaration prohibiting "the use of projectiles the sole object of
which is the diffusion of asphyxiating or deleterious gases."68 In addition, both the 1899
and 1907 Conferences included prohibitions on the use of "poison or poisoned
weapons."69 Unfortunately, these provisions proved unsuccessful, as in 1915, during the
First World War battle of Ypres, the German military unleashed a chemical attack against
57 1993 Convention on the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on
their Destruction (hereinafter "The Chemical Weapons Convention" or "CWC") art. l(l)(b). The
Convention has 178 state parties as of March 19, 2007.
58 Id. at art. I(1)(a).
59 Id. at art. I(1)(c).
60Id. at art. I(1)(d).
61 Id. at art. I(2)-(4).
62 WALTER KRUTZSCH & RALF TRAPP, A COMMENTARY ON THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION 12
(1994).
63 Id. at 13.
64id. at 13.
65 Chemical Weapons Convention, art. VII(l)(c).
66 Chemical Weapons Convention, art. XXII.
67 Margaret Sewell, Freedom from Fear: Prosecuting the Iraqi Regime for the Use of Chemical Weapons,
16 ST. THOMAS L. REv. 365, 378 (2004).
68 Declaration Concerning the Prohibition of the Use of Projectiles Diffusing Asphyxiating Gases, July 29,
1899, reprinted in A MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND ARMS CONTROL
AGREEMENTS 99 (M. CheriflBassiouni ed., 2000) (hereinafter "Hague Declaration").
69 First International Peace Conference, The Hague, 1899, reprinted in I AM. J. INT'L L. 103, 105; Second
International Peace Conference, The Hague, 1907, reprinted in 2 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 106.
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the French forces. 70 This led the English, French and Americans to retaliate in kind.
During the First World War, 1.3 million casualties were caused by such chemical
attacks.7'
The Treaty of Versailles provided further prohibitions on the use of chemical
weapons. Germany was banned from their possession and use.7 2 Their use was also
outlawed in the Treaty in Relation to the Use of Submarines and Noxious Gases in
Warfare 1922 (the latter of which never entered into force).73
It was not until the Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of
Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare
(hereinafter 'Geneva Protocol') opened for signature in 1925 that a relatively broader ban
was implemented. The Geneva Protocol outlawed "the use in war of asphyxiating,
poisonous or other gases, and of all analogous liquids materials or devices .. .
The Hague Conventions and the Geneva Protocol had a number of serious
limitations. Firstly, both were merely prohibiting the use of chemical weapons, and
providing no safeguards against their possession, development, transfer, or stockpile.
75
Secondly, the ban on use only applied as between State Parties to the instruments, and
had no effect on the use of the weapons against a non-state party. Furthermore, the
Hague Convention applied only during war.76 Thirdly, a large number of states entered
reservations to the Geneva Protocol allowing them the right to retaliate in kind if they are
attacked with chemical weapons. This rendered the applicability of the Protocol merely a
ban on first use.77 Regardless of limitations, these instruments were a step towards
chemical disarmament and formed the basis of the international arms control regime
throughout most of the twentieth century.
B. Legal Framework
1. What is a Chemical Weapon?
In order to establish what chemicals and activities fall within the prohibitions
outlined above, Article II of the CWC provides a set of definitions. The CWC has a
unique formulation for identifying chemical weapons. Article II(l)(a) defines a chemical
weapon as:
(a) Toxic chemicals and their precursors, except where intended for
purposes not prohibited under this Convention, as long as the types and
quantities are consistent with such purposes;
70 Will Irwin, The German Army Dispersed Chlorine Gas over Allied Lines at Ypres on 22 April 1915, N.Y.
TRIB., April 25-27, 1915, available at http://net.lib.byu.edu!-rdh7/wwi/ 1915/chlorgas.html.
" David B. Merkin, The Efficiency of Chemical Arms Treaties in the Aftermath of the Iran-Iraq War, 9
B.U. INT'LL. J. 175, 177 (1991).
72 Treaty of Versailles (1919) art. 171.
73 David P. Fidler, International Law and Weapons of Mass Destruction: End of the Arms Control
Approach?, 14 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 39, 48-49 (2004).
74 Geneva Protocol (1925) available at http://www.state.gov/t/ac/trt/4784.htm.
7' Fidler, supra note 73.
76 d.
77 Lisa Tabassi, Impact of the CWC: Progressive Development of Customary International Law and
Evolution of the Customary Norm Against Chemical Weapons, THE CBW CONVENTIONS BULL., Issue 63,
Mar. 2004, at 1.
2007]
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2007
JOURNAL OF LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE
(b) Munitions and devices, specifically designed to cause death or other
harm through the toxic properties of those toxic chemicals specified in
subparagraph (a), which would be released as a result of employment of
such munitions and devices;
(c) Any equipment specifically designed for use directly in connection
with the employment of munitions and devices specified in subparagraph
(b).78
The above are considered chemical weapons, together or separately. Although a
list of toxic chemicals and precursors considered to be of particular danger are provided
in three schedules annexed to the Convention, these are included not to further define
chemical weapons, but to serve as the list of chemicals subject to declaration, inspection
and verification under the Convention. The definition is based on two central questions:
first, is it a toxic chemical or precursor, and second, what is the intent of use? In
assessing whether a substance is a chemical weapon, the definition must be read together
with the definition of toxic chemicals, precursors, and purposes not prohibited.
2. What is a Toxic Chemical?
Toxic chemicals are defined in Article 11(2) as:
Any chemical which through its chemical action on life processes can
cause death, temporary incapacitation or permanent harm to humans or
animals. This includes all such chemicals regardless of their origin or of
their method of production, regardless of whether they are produced in
facilities, in munitions or elsewhere.
79
In order to fall within this definition, the chemical must, as a result of its chemical
action on life processes, cause death, temporary incapacitation or permanent harm to
humans or animals.80  This highlights two important issues. First, utilization of the
chemical must be accompanied by an intent to exploit its toxic properties, which manifest
themselves through the chemical action on life processes. As a result, other toxic or
harmful chemicals, such as dynamite, incendiaries, smoke mixtures, missile fuel and so
forth, the toxic properties of which are not being exploited and the toxic side-effects of
which are incidental to the intended use of the substance, would not be considered
chemical weapons. For example, if death, temporary incapacitation or permanent harm
arose out of exposure to missile fuel, and the exposure was not the result of an intent to
utilize the toxic properties of the fuel, it would not be considered a chemical weapon.
However, if the fuel were sprayed upon the victims with the intent to exploit its toxic
properties, it would be considered a chemical weapon. The terms "temporary
incapacitation" and "permanent harm" are not further defined in the Convention.
'8 Chemical Weapons Convention, art. 11(1).
" Id. at art. 11(2).
so The Chemical Weapons Convention Preamble indicates that herbicides are covered elsewhere in
international law.
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The second issue this paragraph raises is that toxicity is not dependent upon
lethality. The toxic effect can also fall within a lower standard of causing temporary
incapacitation or permanent harm. This is echoed in Article I(1)(b), which refers to
munitions and devices causing "death or other harm." 81 Therefore, lethality is not a
requirement for inclusion within the terms of this definition.
3. What are Precursors?
The CWC defines precursors in Article II(l)(c) as "[a]ny chemical reactant which
takes part at any stage in the production by whatever method of a toxic chemical. This
includes any key component of a binary or multicomponent chemical system."
Taking the plain and ordinary meaning of these words creates a potentially broad
definition. The phrases "at any stage in the production" and "by whatever method" allow
this to apply to a very wide variety of chemical reactants. It would seemingly include, for
example, an agent that reacts with chemicals in the air or body to form a lethal chemical
agent. As Ralf Trapp and Walter Krutzsch write, since this is an entirely open-ended
definition, it should be read in conjunction with the general purpose criterion in Article
TI(1)(a), thereby requiring the intent criteria to be the ultimate determining factor.82 If the
intent criterion is satisfied, the use of a precursor would amount to the use of a chemical
weapon.
4. Lawful Use - "Purposes not Prohibited"
The CWC was not designed to stifle international trade or the technological
development of the chemical industry. 83  As many chemicals have dual uses, the
Convention's drafters understood that legitimate purposes should not be hindered.
Therefore, they specified the permitted uses of toxic chemicals and precursors. These
"purposes not prohibited" are defined in Article 11(9) as:
(a) Industrial, agricultural, research, medical, pharmaceutical or other
peaceful purposes;
(b) Protective purposes, namely those purposes directly related to
protection against toxic chemicals and to protection against chemical
weapons;
(c) Military purposes not connected with the use of chemical weapons and
not dependent on the use of the toxic properties of chemicals as a method
of warfare;
(d) Law enforcement including domestic riot control purposes.
84
8' Chemical Weapons Convention, art. I(l)(b)
82 Krutzsch and Trapp, supra note 62 at 26.
83 Chemical Weapons Convention, art. XI; See also Alexander Kelle and Pamela Mills, The Chemical
Weapons Convention Regime and its Evolution, published in MARIE ISABELLE CHEVRIER ET AL., THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF LEGALLY BINDING MEASURES TO STRENGTHEN THE BIOLOGICAL AND TOxIN
WEAPONS CONVENTION 82 (2004).
84 Chemical Weapons Convention, art. 11(9).
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Of particular importance to the present discussion are paragraphs (c) and (d).
These relate to the legitimate use of a toxic chemical by military or law enforcement
personnel. Paragraph (d) will be discussed in the "riot control agent section" below.
Paragraph (c) creates an exception, similar to the missile fuel example outlined above, by
which a toxic chemical may be utilized for military purposes so long as such use is not
dependent on the toxic properties of the chemical as a method of warfare. Therefore, this
paragraph relies on the intent of the chemical's application.
5. Summary
The above definitions and criteria were carefully negotiated. Read together, no
loopholes exist in the convention's ban on chemical weapons. The definition of a
chemical weapon is purpose driven: all toxic chemicals and their precursors qualify as
chemical weapons, unless the chemical's intended purpose is not prohibited and the type
and quantity used are consistent with that purpose.
C. Application to Fallujah
During the debates surrounding the use of white phosphorus in Fallujah, one of
the central accusations against US forces was that the use was a violation of the
prohibition against the use of chemical weapons. This is a strong argument. Although
poorly advocated in the news media, the use of white phosphorus by US forces was a
violation of the prohibition against the use of chemical weapons. As outlined above,
chemical weapons can be either toxic chemicals or precursors. The following questions
determine whether a chemical falls within these two categories:
1) Is it a toxic chemical or precursor?
2) Was it used for purposes prohibited by the CWC? and if so
3) Were the types and quantities consistent with such use? and
4) Was the chemical used to exploit its toxic properties?
If the final answer to these questions is "yes," then white phosphorus was used as a
chemical weapon and the prohibition against chemical weapons use was violated.
Before undertaking any further analysis, it should be noted that Article 3 1(1) of the
Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties states that a treaty "shall be interpreted in
good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty
in their context and in the light of its object and purpose."8 5 With this in mind, the first
question is, was white phosphorus a toxic chemical? As discussed above, 86 toxic
chemicals' effect on life processes cause death, temporary incapacitation or other
permanent harm. Pertaining to the chemical nature of white phosphorus and its reaction
in the human body, it does not appear to meet these requirements. Instead, the
physiological effect of white phosphorous when it comes into contact with the skin is
closer to that of an incendiary weapon. Specifically, it bums the skin through the
generation of high levels of heat, rather than as part of a chemical reaction. The evidence
85 Vienna Convention on Law of Treaties, art. 31, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
86 See supra sect. It(C).
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from the Fallujah assault supports this. Many victims of the Fallujah assault complained
of suffering strange burns that could not be extinguished with water.87 As such, it is
unlikely that white phosphorus would be considered a toxic chemical and, therefore,
cannot be considered a chemical weapon.
Alternatively, it is plausible that white phosphorus smoke could be a precursor as
defined by the CWC. As discussed above, the CWC's definition of a precursor is broad:
any chemical reactant that takes part in any stage of the production of a toxic chemical. 88
Here, when the mortar shells containing white phosphorous were detonated the burning
phosphorus released a dense white smoke, containing phosphorus pentoxide and
phosphoric acid, which irritated the body. Thus, white phosphorus served as a precursor
in this process. By itself it could not be a chemical weapon because its effect is felt
through heat and burns. However, when white phosphorous reacts with oxygen and
water, whether in the air or in the body, the chemical reaction becomes complete and is
devastating. Yet, as defined in Article 11(2) of the CWC's definition, classification as a
"precursor" requires one further element: that the final chemical product be toxic. 89
Furthermore, this toxic chemical must cause death, temporary incapacitation or
permanent harm to humans through its chemical action on life processes. 9° These three
requirements are read disjunctively. Although death is possible if one is exposed to an
overwhelming amount of phosphoric acid, temporary incapacitation is the most typical
result. Interpreted broadly, this could mean that because the insurgents were unable to
maintain their positions, fight effectively, and operate as they normally would they were
temporarily incapacitated. However, a narrower reading would require a loss of
consciousness, such as was present when an unknown chemical agent was used by
Russian forces during the November 2002 Moscow theater hostage siege. It is not clear
which interpretation should be used. There is no agreed upon definition of temporary
incapacitation stemming from the CWC. However, when one considers the CWC's
Preamble, which states that it is determined for the sake of all mankind to exclude
completely the possibility of the use of chemical weapons,9 1 and when one upholds the
VCLT's Article 31(1),92 the best interpretation is likely to fall closer to a broader reading.
Under such a reading, it is easy to conclude that the effect white phosphorus smoke has
on its victims is one of temporary incapacitation. This brings white phosphorous within
the CWC's definition of a chemical weapon.
In addition, the use of white phosphorous by US forces does not fall within any of
the exceptions of the CWC's "purposes not prohibited."93 Article II(9)(c) does not apply
because this was not a use "not dependent on the use of the toxic properties of chemicals
as a method of warfare." 94 The bombs deployed by US forces were not used in this
87 Buncombe & Hughes, supra note 21
" See Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, Convention on the Prohibtion of the
Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons, Apr. 29, 1997, O.P.C.W., available
at http: http://www.opcw.org/docs/cwceng.pdf.
'9 See id.
90 See id.
9' See id.
92 Vienna Convention on Law of Treaties, art. 31, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (interpreting treaties in
good faith).
3 The Chemical Weapons Convention, art. 11(9).
94 See id.
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instance as a smoke screen. Instead, they were clearly dependent upon the toxic
properties of white phosphorus as a precursor.
The final element that must be proved is the intent of the commander ordering the
use of white phosphorus. Was it used to take advantage of its toxic properties?
Following the assumptions above, white phosphorus was used here in order to flush the
insurgents from their protected spaces, so that highly flammable explosive rounds could
be fired as they fled the building. Thus, white phosphorus was used as a precursor
chemical reactant, with the intent of exploiting the toxic properties of the phosphoric acid
it produced.
My conclusion is that due to the method of use and intent for which white
phosphorus was deployed, it served as a precursor that was not being used for "purposes
not prohibited." Thus, it was a chemical weapon, the use of which is strictly prohibited
under any circumstances by the CWC. Therefore, the United States breached its
obligations under the CWC.
IV. RIOT CONTROL AGENTS
Another CWC prohibition potentially violated by the use of white phosphorus in
Fallujah was the use of a riot control agent (RCA) in warfare. Prior to the adoption of the
CWC, international law was somewhat ambiguous regarding whether or not RCAs were
chemical weapons. This was largely because the Geneva Protocol did not directly
address the issue. During the Vietnam War, US forces came under heavy criticism for
their use of tear gas as a method of warfare. Tear gas was primarily used to demobilize
and disorientate the enemy and was often followed with heavy rounds of lethal
conventional munitions. There were also allegations that the North Vietnamese
committed similar acts.
A. General Purpose Criterion
The CWC is the first treaty to deal specifically with the issue of RCAs. Article
1(5) states that "[e]ach State Party undertakes not to use riot control agents as a method of
warfare." 95 RCAs are defined in Article 11(7) as "[a]ny chemical not listed in a Schedule,
which can produce rapidly in humans sensory irritation or disabling physical effects
which disappear within a short time following termination of exposure." There is some
disagreement between the position of the United States and that of the rest of the world
regarding what acts this prohibition encompasses,. The US belief is that the prohibitions
regarding RCA use should couple Article I(5) with the corresponding definition in Article
11(7). Therefore, the United States argues that the prohibition against RCA use as a
method of warfare is the only constraint. If this interpretation were correct it would
permit a state to develop, produce, retain and transfer RCAs in any form and in any
quantity, so long as it did not actually use them as a method of warfare. 97 This goes
95 Id.
96 Id.
97 Abram Chayes, Matthew Mesclson and R. Justin Smith, Proposed Guidelines on the Status of Riot
Control Agents and Other Toxic Chemicals under the Chemical Weapons Convention, Background
Document, 19th Workshop of the Pugwash Study Group on the Implementation of the Chemical and
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against the purposes and principles of the CWC and would allow a large class of toxic
chemicals to evade the Convention's control mechanisms. 98 It would also create a system
replicating what already existed under the Geneva Protocol, in which only use was
prohibited and not the development, production, retention, and transfer of certain agents.
Most state parties to the CWC, however, agree that it contains further restrictions
and that the general purpose criterion applies to RCAs. These countries argue that by
definition, a RCA is a toxic chemical, because the CWC defines a toxic chemical as
"[a]ny chemical which through its chemical action on life processes can cause death,
temporary incapacitation or permanent harm to humans or animals." 99 Comparing this
definition to the definition of a RCA, it is clear that a RCA must cause "sensory irritation
or disabling physical effects."' 100 All chemicals that cause such irritation or disabling
physical effects would naturally cause temporary incapacitation. 0 1 Thus, RCAs, by
definition, should be viewed as a subset of toxic chemicals. 0 2 Consequently, RCAs fall
under the restrictions of the general purpose criterion defined in Article 11(1)."' The
general purpose criterion played a central role in the CWC and it would be surprising for
some toxic chemicals to be covered and for some to be excluded. The implications of
this are that RCAs may only be used in a situation which is not a method of warfare,
which complies with the purposes not prohibited under Article 11(9) 1°4 and so long as the
types and quantities were consistent with such purposes.
Of the two positions outlined above, the history of the CWC, its purposes and
objectives, its text and general state practice all lend support to the second and more
restrictive argument. An often quoted example applying the above reasoning involves
the following situation: imagine a stockpile of howitzer shells loaded with a toxic
chemical that meets the RCA requirements of Article 11(7). This RCA, because it
temporarily incapacitates its victims, is a toxic chemical under Article 11(2) and thereby
falls within the general purpose criterion requirements. At this point, two issues in this
scenario need to be addressed. First, it is not clear if its use was intended for purposes
not prohibited under Article 11(9). Second, it is not clear if the types and quantities are
consistent with such purposes. With this in mind, the only two purposes in Article 11(9)
that could possibly apply to this example are sub-paragraphs (c) and (d). Upon closer
inspection, it is evident that sub-paragraph (c) (which requires that "the agent is used for
military purposes not connected with the use of chemical weapons and not dependent on
the use of the toxic properties of chemicals as a method of warfare"',0 5) would not apply
because the inferred intent of loading and using howitzer shells with a RCA does not
necessarily involve anything other than the exploitation of the agent's toxic properties as
a method of warfare. Similarly, sub-paragraph (d) is inapplicable because there is no
plausible argument for why howitzer shells were used for law enforcement including
Biological Weapons Conventions: The First CWC Review Conference and Beyond, The Netherlands, Apr.
26-27, 2003.
9" Id. at 2.
99 See Chemical Weapons Convention.
100 See id.
10 See Chayes, Meselson & Smith, supra note 97 at 2.
02 See id.
103 See id.
104 The purposes not prohibited sub-paragraphs relevant to the present discussion are (9)(c) and (d).
105 See Chayes, Meselson & Smith, supra note 97.
2007]
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2007
JOURNAL OF LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE
domestic riot control purposes. Even if the example were to fall within one of these non-
prohibited purposes, the types and quantities used would still be inconsistent with the
permitted use in either of these sub-paragraphs. Therefore, the shells and the agent would
be considered chemical weapons. Any use of them would result in a violation of the
CWC prohibition on the use of chemical weapons.
In sum, the requirements that must be satisfied to establish whether a RCA is
considered a chemical weapon are: 1) Was the chemical use considered a RCA under the
CWC? 2) Was the RCA used as a method of warfare? 3) Did the use fall under one of the
purposes not prohibited in Article 11(9)? 4) Were the types and quantities consistent with
such purposes?
The first requirement has already been defined above. I will now apply the
second and third points to the use of white phosphorus in Fallujah.
B. Method of Warfare
Article 1(5) of the CWC requires that RCAs not be used as a method of warfare.
10 6
This was a highly contentious section to negotiate because no definition of "method of
warfare" could be agreed upon and none is universally accepted or readily identifiable
from other sources. The final text of the CWC represents a compromise between the
two primary opposing positions, with the United States on one side and the United
Kingdom (supported by most negotiating states) on the other.
1. US Position
Before the CWC, there was no consensus as to the legality of RCA use as a
method of warfare. The 1925 Geneva Gas Protocol did not address the issue directly.
Most states believed that the Protocol prohibited RCA use through its prohibition against
the use of all asphyxiating and poisonous gases and analogous materials.'°8 The United
States offered an extreme position by consistently arguing that the prohibition did not
apply to agents with temporary effects. 109 However, this view did not receive widespread
international support, 110 or unanimous approval within the US government. 1 " In order to
receive Senate ratification of the Protocol, President Gerald Ford was forced into a
compromise position. His administration agreed to Executive Order 11850 (EO 11850),
permitting some restricted uses of RCAs.1 2 The relevant section states:
The United States renounces, as a matter of national policy...first use of
riot control agents in war except in defensive military modes to save lives
such as:
106 See Chemical Weapons Convention.
107 Mjr. Ernest Harper, A Call For a Definition of Method of Warfare in Relation to the Chemical Weapons
Convention, 48 NAVAL L. REV. 132, 133 (2001).
108 Id.
109 Id.
11o See, Narrative, U.S. Department of State, available at http://www.state.gov/t/ac/trt/4784.htm.
111 Harper, supra note 107 at 135.
112 Exec. Order No. 11,850, 3 C.F.R. 980 (1971-1975).
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(a) Use of riot control agents in riot control situations in areas under direct
and distinct U.S. military control, to include controlling rioting prisoners
of war.
(b) Use of riot control agents in situations in which civilians are used to
mask or screen attacks and civilian casualties can be reduced or avoided.
(c) Use of riot control agents in rescue missions in remotely isolated areas,
of downed aircrews and passengers, and escaping prisoners.
(d) Use of riot control agents in rear echelon areas outside the zone of
immediate combat to protect convoys from civil disturbances, terrorists
and paramilitary organizations.
113
During the CWC negotiations the United States argued that chemical weapons
should be defined so as to omit, and therefore exclude RCAs. 114 The United States also
argued that RCAs may be used in numerous types of military-related activities conducted
outside armed conflicts and can be used defensively to save lives, as authorized by
Executive Order 11850.115 This was an attempt by US negotiators to ensure that their
military commanders were able to retain as many tactical battlefield options as possible,
so that they would not be limited by what they perceived as unduly restrictive
regulations.
2. UK and Other States' Positions
The positions of the other negotiating states differed from that of the United
States. The United Kingdom and Australia led the charge for prohibiting all use of RCAs
in hostilities.' 16 They feared that "an interpretation of the CWC that would allow use of
non-lethal agents in war might create a dangerous loophole in the Convention."
' 117
3. Compromise
These two opposing positions were not easily reconciled. What brought
the different parties together was a final compromise by German Ambassador
Adolf von Wagner, who was the chairman of the Conference on Disarmament
working group during the final CWC negotiations. The wording ultimately
accepted in the CWC made a distinction between use during hostilities as a
113 Id.
114 Hearing Before the Comm. on Foreign Relations, 103d Cong. 36 (1994) (statement of Hon. Stephen J.
Ledogar, U.S. Rep. to the Conference on Disarmament, U.S. Dep't of State) [hereinafter "Senate Foreign
Relations Comm. CWC Hearings"]; See also Harper, supra note 107 at 136.
115 David P. Fidler, The International Legal Implications of "Non-Lethal" Weapons, 21 MICH. J. INT'L L.
51, 72-73 (1999).
116 See Harper, supra note 107 at 136; See also Jean Marie Henckaerts & Louise Doswald-Beck, I
CUSTOMARY INT'L HUMANITARIAN L. 264 (2005).
117 See Harper, supra note 107 at 136 n.10.
2007]
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2007
JOURNAL OF LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE
method of warfare and use for purposes of law enforcement. 1' 8 The latter use was
permitted, while the former was prohibited. 9  Ambassador von Wagner
described this compromise stating that, "[t]hese [RCAs] will be banned as a
method of warfare, but allowed for normal domestic law enforcement purposes or
for non-warfare military purposes, such as rescuing a pilot shot down behind
enemy lines, or dealing with a riot in an [sic] prisoner of war camp...."120
As Harper writes, this statement by von Wagner reflects the language of
Executive Order 11850 and demonstrates the compromise made with the United States.
121
Although this is an important prohibition, it is flawed due to its ambiguity. The
compromise allowed excessive room for interpretation. Customary international law
provides little assistance in resolving this ambiguity. The International Committee of the
Red Cross' (ICRC) study on customary international humanitarian law recognizes the
rule that "the use of riot-control agents as a method of warfare is prohibited." '  The
ICRC found that the majority of states agree that this customary prohibition of chemical
weapons applies also to agents with temporary effects.123 However, the ICRC considered
the United States to have made consistent objections to the formation of this rule. The
objections of the United States were evident regarding the Geneva Protocol and the
statements it made during the CWC negotiations. 24  The US does not accept this
customary rule and threatens to use RCAs in defensive military modes to save lives
because of their belief that this does not constitute a method of warfare.
125
Should such objections to customary international law excuse the United States
from the application of this law? According to public international law, a customary
norm is formed when there is both state practice and opiniojuris (opinion of justice).1
26
However, if a state, while such a norm is being developed, persistently objects to its
formation then it will not be bound by it.12 As the United States has argued, its broader
position throughout the development of this norm has consistently been against the use of
RCAs as a method of warfare. Thus, in accordance with public international law, it is
likely that the United States is only bound by its own interpretation of this norm, rather
than that of the majority of the international community.
C. US CWC Ratification
Considering the disagreement regarding the interpretation of "method of warfare,"
it is important to fully understand the US position on the use of RCAs in warfare. Within
the United States, a significant debate regarding the status of RCAs emerged as
118 See Henckaerts & Doswald-Beck, supra note 116 at 264.
" 9 See id.
120 UN Press Release, Ambassador von Wagner, Geneva Dateline (Jun. 23, 1992); see also Harper, supra
note 107 at 137.
121 See Harper supra note 107 at 137.
122 Henckaerts & Doswald-Beck, supra note 116 at 262.
123 Id. at 264.
124 id.
125 id.
126 ANTONIO CASSESE, PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 156 (Oxford Univ. Press 2005).
127 Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 102 cmt. at 26 (1987); see also
D. J. HARRIS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 39 (6th ed., Sweet & Maxwell Ltd. 2004).
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ratification of the CWC became a priority. Under President Bill Clinton's leadership, an
interagency review was conducted. 28 This review found that the CWC precluded use of
RCAs in two situations mentioned in EO 11850, namely, where civilians were used to
screen attacks, and, the rescue of downed aircrew. This position was confirmed by the
then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Shalikashvili.' 29 As a result, in his
letter to the US Senate in June 1994, President Clinton proposed a modification of EO
11850, in which he suggested a more restrictive approach than that permitted in the
Executive Order. The President stated:
Article 1(5) of the CWC prohibits Parties from using RCAs as a "method
of warfare." That phrase is not defined in the CWC. The United States
interprets this provision to mean that:
The CWC applies only to the use of RCAs in international or internal
armed conflict. Other peacetime uses of RCAs, such as normal
peacekeeping operations, law enforcement operations, humanitarian and
disaster relief operations, counter-terrorist and hostage rescue operations,
and noncombatant rescue operations conducted outside such conflicts are
unaffected by the Convention.
The CWC does not apply to all uses of RCAs in time of armed conflict.
Use of RCAs solely against noncombatants for law enforcement, riot
control or other noncombat purposes would not be considered as a
"method of warfare" and therefore would not be prohibited. Accordingly,
the CWC does not prohibit the use of RCAs in riot control situations in
areas under direct US military control, including against rioting prisoners
of war, and to protect convoys from civil disturbances, terrorists and
paramilitary organizations in rear areas outside the zone of immediate
combat.
The CWC does prohibit the use of RCAs solely against combatants. In
addition, according to the current international understanding, the CWC's
prohibition on the use of RCAs as a method of warfare also precludes the
use of RCAs even for humanitarian purposes in a situation where
combatants and noncombatants are intermingled, such as the rescue of
downed air crews, passengers and escaping prisoners and situations where
civilians are being used to mask or screen an attack. However, were the
international understanding of this issue to change, the United States
would not consider itself bound by this position. 1
30
As ratification drew near, President Clinton's approach received opposition in the
US Senate. The Senate charge was led by Senator Sam Nunn of Georgia, Chairman of
28 Harper, supra note 107 at 138.
129 Id.
IN Letter of Transmittal, President of the United States, to Senate of the United States, subject: Ratification
of the CWC (June 23, 1999); see also Harper, supra note 107 at 138 n.26.
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the US Senate Armed Services Committee, arguing that the full range of options
contained in EO 11850 must be retained. Ultimately, Senator Nunn's view prevailed,
with the Senate ratifying on the condition that the President agree to a list of 28
conditions. As the CWC does not allow reservations, these conditions are not considered
to be reservations, but rather outline the US interpretation of the CWC. The most
relevant condition to the present discussion is Condition 26, which stated that RCA use
would be permitted in peacetime military operations in which the United States is not a
party, or under UN Charter Chapter VI or Chapter VII peacekeeping operations where
authorized by the Security Council. The reasoning behind this condition is that in such
operations, the United States is not waging war and therefore any use of RCAs would not
amount to use as a method of warfare.' However, were the United States to be a party
in an international or internal armed conflict, use of RCAs would be barred as
constituting a method of warfare.' 32 A week after these conditions were presented,
President Clinton agreed to them, and the CWC was subsequently ratified by the United
States on April 27, 1997.
The US military developed its policy on RCA use in light of the restrictions
contained in the CWC, as well as the US Senate's ratification conditions. This policy is
embodied in the Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff Instruction 3110.07A (hereinafter
"CJCSI 3110.07A"). This instruction reflects both Condition 26 and EO 11850. The
instruction provides two situations in which use of RCAs would be permitted: in wartime,
and in peacetime. The use in war copies the four conditions set out in EO 11850, but
adds a fifth option, namely the protection and recovery of nuclear weapons. The uses in
peacetime reflect the above Condition 26, allowing the use of RCA during peacekeeping
operations.
The US position has not received widespread international support.' 33 It even
stands in contrast to a report commissioned by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO). In 1997, NATO's North Atlantic Assembly commissioned Lord Lyell to
undertake a report on non-lethal weapons. The draft report of September 1997, entitled
"Non-Lethal Weapons" (known as the Lyell Report, excerpts of which were published in
Defense News) firmly states that RCAs can only be used in domestic law enforcement
and not in foreign peacekeeping missions.134 Allowing "peaceful" military applications
of RCAs presents a slippery slope argument. It is very difficult to define every situation
as either a peaceful military application or a method of warfare. The prohibition against
use as a method of warfare must be clear-cut in order to prevent abuse and
misunderstandings.
In summary, the official position of the United States is that RCAs may not be
used as a method of warfare, except in order to save lives as expounded by EO 11850 or
in "peaceful" operations as outlined in Condition 26. These exceptions are generally
considered to be for limited, life-saving, and defensive purposes. Although they do not
amount to a reservation to the CWC, the US government will allow its commanders to act
within these parameters without invoking any disciplinary action. This unilateral
131 Harper, supra note 107 at 142.
132 Id.
133 Fidler, supra note 73 at 74.
134 Nick Lewer, Research Project 1, Bradford Non-Lethal Weapons Research Project (Nov. 1997) available
at http://www.bradford.ac.uk/acad/nlw/research-reports/researchreport 1 .php.
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American interpretation has not found wide international acceptance. If US forces
actually employed such methods, they could be violating the CWC.
1. Aggravating Factor
a. RCA in Conjunction with Lethal Force
Would the use of RCAs in conjunction with lethal force be a violation of the
prohibition of use as a method of warfare? An example of such use is to employ a RCA
to flush the enemies out of their protected position (e.g., a cave, building etc.) in order to
engage them with lethal force. Would such use of RCAs as a force multiplier be
considered a method of warfare?
During Congressional testimony, Dr. Amy Smithson explained what would
clearly constitute a method of warfare:
Distinguishing method of warfare use from a limited, defensive, life
saving use of RCAs should be a fairly straightforward matter. The law of
war describes a method of warfare as a way to attain military objectives.
According to this definition, flushing enemy soldiers from foxholes into
the line of fire, or launching an RCA attack on an enemy command post
easily qualify as method of warfare uses.'
35
There is little disagreement amongst commentators that a RCA attack as a force
multiplier would come under the definition of "method of warfare."' 13 6 The then US
Secretary of Defense, William Perry, in a memorandum entitled "Riot Control Agents
and the Chemical Weapons Convention," addressed to the Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs, agreed "that the CWC would prevent some militarily useful
applications of RCAs, when they would achieve a military objective, e.g. against troops
in caves."' 137 The use of a RCA in such a manner would constitute a method of warfare
and be prohibited. 
38
One of the dangers of allowing force multiplier use of a RCA is the fear of
escalation. The enemy may not realize that the chemical is "merely" a RCA and could
retaliate with a lethal agent. The Chemical Weapons Convention Bulletin rightly
summarizes this point:
The question is whether the risk of further escalation does not outweigh
such limited military benefit as these uses might bring. Use of disabling
chemicals on intermingled combatants and civilians in a war zone, for
example, could lead to or become the excuse for unrestricted employment
in urban warfare.' 
39
135 Harper, supra note 107 at 149.
136/d. at 150.
13 71d. at 151.
138 id.
139 Editors, 15 CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION BULL. 4 (1992).
2007]
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2007
JOURNAL OF LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE
2. Mitigating Factors
When weighing whether a specific use of RCAs is a "method of warfare" in
violation of the CWC, a number of mitigating factors deserve consideration. Although
none of these criteria exist in the CWC itself, nor would excuse the violations of the
CWC, they may lessen the severity of the accusations.
a. Mitigating Factor 1: Avoiding Unnecessary Non-Combatant Casualties
Harper writes that the most important measure in determining whether a particular
employment of a RCA constitutes a method of warfare is whether the goal of that
employment is to avoid unnecessary non-combatant casualties.140 As with a number of
considerations in the CWC, this factor also boils down to the intent of RCA use: was the
intent to save innocent lives, or to enhance the effects of lethal weapons? If the intent of
using RCAs was to avoid unnecessary non-combatant casualties, for example in an urban
setting, then this would weigh against such use being considered a method of warfare. 141
However, if used as a force multiplier, there is little room for argument that they were not
used as a method of warfare. The intent to save innocent lives was the overriding
consideration that guided the US military and civilian administration to allow the use of
RCAs in certain limited situations under EO 11850.142 An example in which such use
could be permitted is to control civilians rioting and threatening food convoys traveling
to refugee camps.143 The intent in such a situation is to save lives, reduce casualties and
protect supplies.
Commentators have also argued that use against enemy combatants would be
barred irrespective of purpose. 144 Such use will virtually always be designed to advance
some military objective. 45 Even if the intent is to save enemy combatants' lives, the
method is used to their harassment and/or immobilization, which is a military objective,
and thereby exploits the toxic properties of the chemicals as a method of warfare. 46
b. Mitigating Factor 2: Incidental Operations
A further mitigating factor is whether the RCA use is incidental to attaining the
military objective. A number of cases outlined in EO 11850 would fall within this factor.
An example is employing RCAs in an operation to clear civilians from the vicinity of a
downed aircraft. The primary objective of the operation is not the clearing of civilians,
but rather the recovery of the aircrew. 147 As such, RCA use would be incidental to the
primary objective.
140 Harper, supra note 107 at 152-153.
141 Id. at 153.
142 id.
143 Id.
144 Chayes, Meselson & Smith, supra note 97 at 6.
145 id.
146 id.
147 Harper, supra note 107 at 154.
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If the RCA were used as part of achieving a military objective, however, it would
be considered a method of warfare. An example is utilizing a RCA to flush soldiers from
a defensive position in a cave in order to engage them.1 48
C. Law Enforcement Purposes
As mentioned earlier, an important aspect of the general purpose criterion
defining a chemical weapon is the series of "purposes not prohibited" exceptions. These
exceptions describe situations in which the use of toxic chemicals and their precursors are
permitted. Of the four exceptions, Article II(9)(d) is of relevance to the Fallujah assault.
This section allows use of a toxic chemical if it is for law enforcement purposes,
including domestic riot control, and if the types and quantities of the chemicals used are
consistent with this purpose. This argument is posed as an additional or alternative
argument in case it is found that the white phosphorus was not used as a method of
warfare.
1. Law Enforcement vs. Domestic Riot Control
There has been considerable debate over the choice of wording in Article II(9)(d).
A split has emerged over the relationship between the phrases "law enforcement" and
"domestic riot control." The United States adopts the ordinary meaning of the phrases,
that is, that "domestic riot control" is a subset of "law enforcement" and that other
permissible law enforcement activities exist that may not be domestic riot control.
149
According to Ambassador Stephen Ledogar, the US CWC-negotiating ambassador, in
written testimony to the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee:
We understand the language 'law enforcement including domestic riot
control' to mean that domestic riot control is a subset of law enforcement
activities. We understand other law enforcement activities to include:
controlling rioting prisoners of war; rescuing hostages; counter terrorist
operations; drug enforcement operations; and non-combatant
evacuation. 
50
However, an opposing interpretation was proposed by the United Kingdom and
supported by the majority of negotiating states which stated that the Convention entitles
state parties:
to use toxic chemicals for law enforcement, including domestic riot
control purposes, provided that such chemicals are limited to those not
listed in the schedules to the convention and which can produce rapidly in
148 Id.
149 j. P. Perry Robinson, Solving the Problem of 'Law enforcement', Discussion Paper, 19th Workshop of
the Pugwash Study Group on the Implementation of the Chemical and Biological Weapons Conventions:
The First CWC Review Conference and Beyond, The Netherlands (Apr. 2003) at 1.
150 102d Congress, 2nd Session, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations (May 1, 1992), Chemical
Weapons Ban Negotiation Issues, S.Hrg. 102-719, USGPO, at 34-35.
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humans sensory irritation or disabling physical effects which disappear
within a short time following termination of exposure.'
5 1
This second interpretation incorporates the RCA definition from Article 11(7). It
consequently limits the use of chemicals for law enforcement purposes only to those
which are permitted for riot control purposes, thereby coming to the opposite
interpretation of the United States and making law enforcement purposes a subset of
domestic riot control. 152 This interpretation complies with Article 31 of the VCLT by
interpreting the provision "in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be
given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in light of its object and purpose."153
According to the CWC's Preamble, the Convention's object and purpose is to
exclude "completely the possibility of the use of chemical weapons." 154 The practical
effect of the US position is that it creates an entire class of chemicals that would be
completely free from the Convention's prohibitions. As the CWC provides only a
definition of RCAs, and not of law enforcement, and since the United States considers
RCAs a subset of chemicals used for law enforcement purposes, those latter chemicals
would not fall under the CWC control mechanisms. As Robinson states, the US position
pays little attention to the object and purpose of the Convention by legitimizing the
development, production and stockpiling of anti-personnel chemicals having
physiological effects different from those of existing police-issue tear gases and other
similar substances.' 
55
The consequences of adopting the US position are that white phosphorus smoke
could potentially be used in a situation that is arguably one of law enforcement, but
which does not fall within the riot control definition. Although at odds with the
interpretation accepted by most CWC state parties, the United States could argue that
Fallujah was a situation of law enforcement and that therefore the use of white
phosphorus was permitted. However, as will be outlined below, it is unlikely that such an
interpretation is acceptable. The analysis below will discuss the meaning and scope of
the term "law enforcement." It will also explore issues of law enforcement authorization
under national and international law. Lastly, these will be applied to the Fallujah assault
to assess whether the situation was one of law enforcement.
2. The Meaning and Scope of "Law Enforcement"
As mentioned above, the CWC does not provide a separate definition of the term
"law enforcement." There is confusion regarding what law may be enforced, how and
where it may be enforced, and under what circumstances. I56 Krutzsch gives some
guidance on this issue. He points out that the phrase "law enforcement including
'5 UK Foreign & Commonwealth Office Minister of State Douglas Hogg, written response to a
Parliamentary question from Mr. Macdonald addressed to the Secretary of State for Foreign and
Commonwealth Affairs (Dec. 7, 1992), Hansard (Commons) vol. 215 no. 89 cols. 461-62; see also
Robinson, supra note 149 at 1.
152 Robinson, supra note 149 at 1.
153 Vienna Convention for the Law of Treaties (1969), art. 31(1).
154 Chemical Weapons Convention, Preamble.
155 Robinson, supra note 149 at 1.
156 Chayes, Meselson & Smith, supra note 97 at 15.
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domestic riot control" presupposes a specific factual situation in which domestic law and
order are violated or endangered. 57 In such a situation, the "use of force by police or
other organs must be allowed within the scope of a state's jurisdiction to re-establish law
and order."
1 58
The terms "law enforcement" and "domestic riot control" have different
meanings. Krutzsch states that "law enforcement" is the more general term, whereas
"domestic riot control" is more specific. An example of law enforcement that Krutzsch
provides is the reprimand by a policeman on night patrol towards individuals disturbing
sleep. The consequences of law enforcement are a fine or arrest. In contrast, a domestic
riot control situation involves rioting citizens with the consequent security action
involving cordons, police sticks, water-canons and tear gas.,59
3. Who May Enforce the Law?
Without a proper definition, the question of who may execute law enforcement is
of vital importance. The editors of the Chemical Weapons Convention Bulletin have
provided a proposed guideline to this question:
The term "law enforcement" in Article II(9)(d) means actions taken within
the scope of a nation's "jurisdiction to enforce" its national laws, as that
term is understood in international law. When such actions are taken in
the context of law enforcement or riot control functions under the
authority of the United Nations, they must be specifically authorized by
that organization. No act is one of "law enforcement" if it otherwise
would be prohibited as a "method of warfare" under Article 119(c).161
a. Enforcement of National Law
It is clear that national law may be enforced within a state's territorial boundary
and upon its subjects. This is not in dispute and is a cardinal principle of national
jurisdiction and state sovereignty. However, may a state enforce its laws within the
territory and upon the subjects of another state? As the above guideline states, the phrase
"jurisdiction to enforce" national laws must be considered in the context of international
law. It is a cardinal principle that "a state cannot take measures on the territory of
another state by way of enforcement of national laws without the consent of the latter."
' 161
Therefore, the enforcement of national law depends on territorial and subject-matter
jurisdiction. 162 No person may be arrested, detained, or taxed while in the territory of
157 Waiter Krutzsch, "'Non-Lethal" Chemicals for Law Enforcement?, 19th Workshop of the Pugwash
Study Group on the Implementation of the Chemical and Biological Weapons Conventions: The First CWC
Review Conference and Beyond, Netherlands (Apr. 2003) at 3.
1
58 Id.
9 Id. at 4.
160 Proposed Guidelines on the Status of Riot Control Agents and Other Toxic Chemicals Under the
Chemical Weapons Convention, 35 CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION BULL. 15 (1997).
161 IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 306 (2003).
' 62 Id. at 297.
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another state, except when permitted by that state. 163 In the context of the CWC, for a
state to use RCAs for law enforcement activities in another state's territory, it must first
receive the consent of that state.
b. Enforcement of International Law
International law does not provide greater clarity on the issue. Is it permissible
for a state to justify its use of RCAs by claiming that it is enforcing international law?
Are there restrictions on such actions? As Chayes and Meselson write, only in the
narrowest of circumstances should states be permitted to invoke international law to
justify their "law enforcement" activities, because it would be an invitation to anarchy to
permit states to judge and enforce violations of international law themselves. 164 As such,
the United Nations provides international law enforcement the greatest legitimacy.
Under the UN Charter, two organs are empowered to authorize international actions
involving the use of force: the General Assembly and the Security Council. 165 Without
their approval, such activities would not be legal law enforcement. Despite UN approval,
these actions would still have to comply with the prohibitions under treaty and customary
law on the use of RCAs as a method of warfare.'
6
D. Application to Fallujah
The above law will be applied to the Fallujah assault to ascertain whether the use
of white phosphorus smoke amounted to a use of a RCA as a method of warfare, and/or
whether it was a situation of law enforcement.
White phosphorus smoke does have properties consistent with a RCA. As
mentioned earlier, burning white phosphorus emits a dense white smoke composed of
particles of phosphorus pentoxide, which reacts with moisture in the air to form
phosphoric acid. I This acid may produce a variety of topically irritating injuries to the
victim, as well as eye, nose and respiratory irritation. 168 The testing carried out in 1935
demonstrated that the symptoms were reversible when the victim left the exposure site. 169
This fits the CWC definition of a RCA under Article 11(7), i.e., that it be a chemical
producing sensory irritation or disabling physical effects that disappear within a short
time following termination of exposure.' It would therefore be a violation of the CWC
if the United States had used white phosphorus smoke as a method of warfare.
Exposure to the chemical produces temporary incapacitation, which places white
phosphorus within the general purpose criterion and the definition of a toxic chemical. In
order to be a lawful use of the chemical, the United States would have to show that it was
using the smoke for a purpose not prohibited (i.e. law enforcement) and that the types and
163Id. at 306.
164 Chayes, Meselson & Smith, supra note 97 at 15.
165 CASSESE, supra note 126 at 346-52.
166 See Chemical Weapons Convention, art. 1(5) ("Each State Party undertakes not to use riot control agents
as a method of warfare.").
67 ATSDR, supra note 43.
168 GlobalSecurity.org, supra note 45.
169 National Academy of Sciences, supra note 50 at 24.
170 Chemical Weapons Convention, art. I1(7).
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quantities were consistent with such use. Even though the use of white phosphorus as a
method of warfare would violate the CWC, it is important to address the arguments that
could be raised in favor of US use of the chemical.
US law provides the minimum standard of legally acceptable use of a RCA
because it has the most lenient standards for determining the legality of a method of
warfare. If the United States viewed an action as illegal, then it would also be illegal
under the more restrictive international position. The United States considers RCA use in
wartime situations to be legal if used for peaceful purposes. EO 11850 outlines five such
purposes, and Condition 26 of the Senate CWC Ratification Conditions provides a
number of further permitted peaceful RCA applications. 17 When examining EO 11850,
it is evident that the white phosphorus use in Fallujah was not a situation of controlling
rioting prisoners of war, nor a rescue mission for downed aircrews, passengers, escaping
prisoners of war, nor one of use in rear echelons outside the zone of immediate combat to
protect convoys. A possible argument is that the Fallujah assault was one of EO 11850
condition (b) allowing the use of RCAs in situations where civilians are used to mask or
screen attacks and civilian casualties can be reduced or avoided. However, this does not
seem to fit the witness accounts of how white phosphorus was employed in Fallujah. All
accounts, including official US government statements, portrayed US forces firing the
substance at positions where they believed were barricaded insurgents. These insurgents
were flushed out by the agent and hit with high explosives upon exiting their barricades.
This description does not fit with EO 11850 condition (b) because there was no evidence
that white phosphorus was used to separate civilians from combatants. Furthermore, US
forces employed lethal force upon those exiting their barricades, without attempting to
distinguish between combatants and civilians. White phosphorus was thus a force
multiplier, used in conjunction with lethal force. It was not used defensively or
peacefully as required by EO 11850, nor did it fit within the peacekeeping exceptions
under Condition 26. Its use can only be considered a method of warfare.
In addition, neither of the two mitigating factors described above applies. As
stated, white phosphorus was not used as a means of avoiding civilian casualties because
otherwise those fleeing their barricades would not have faced lethal force. Furthermore,
its use was not incidental to attain a military objective. The primary objective was to
flush the enemies out of their barricades in order to kill them. White phosphorus smoke
was employed as a RCA as a method of warfare, violating CWC provisions. When
RCAs are used unlawfully, they are considered to be chemical weapons. Therefore, the
United States used a chemical weapon in the Fallujah assault, violating international
treaty, humanitarian and human rights law.
It is noteworthy to consider the existing grey areas between the law of armed
conflict and law enforcement by occupying powers, and between law enforcement and
fighting a civil war. Determining in which category a particular conflict or battle fits
depends largely on interpretation of the facts and circumstances. As argued above, white
phosphorus was used in Fallujah as a method of warfare. However, could the United
States, in its defense, argue that it was using the RCA for law enforcement purposes, as
permitted by the purposes not prohibited section in Article II(9)(d)?
171 Exec. Order No. I 1,850, 3 C.F.R. 980 (1971-1975); Summary of the Senate Resolution of Ratification to
the Chemical Weapons Convention, http://www.armscontrol.org/act/1997_04/cwcanal.asp.
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Firstly, the issue of authorization to enforce the law must be established. It is
arguable that the United States was authorized to undertake operations under both
national and international law. As outlined above, two US led assaults were conducted in
Fallujah, one in April 2004, and the other in November 2004. During the April assault,
no sovereign Iraqi government existed and power rested in the US led Coalition
Provisional Authority, headed by US Administrator L. Paul Bremer. Since no Iraqi
government existed, the United States, as the occupying power, provided the national
authorization. The United States was not imposing its law on another sovereign state (as
prohibited under international law) because no sovereign Iraqi government existed at that
time. Instead, the United States was authorized to take actions to maintain peace and
security in its area of control, which included the authority to provide law enforcement.
In contrast, the situation differed in the November assault because the Coalition
Provisional Authority officially handed over power to the Iraqi Interim Government,
headed by Prime Minister lyad Allawi, on June 28, 2004. However, Prime Minister
Allawi provided national authorization for the November assault.
Consequently, it is arguable that both the April and November assaults received
authorization, once from the United States, as the occupying power, and once from the
Iraqi Interim Government.
Under international law, the United States and United Kingdom were also
authorized by the UN Security Council to occupy Iraq and restore security and stability to
the country.172 This recognition was accorded in response to a letter sent by the United
States and United Kingdom to the Security Council in which they acknowledged and
accepted their legal status as occupying powers in Iraq and accepted all the attendant
rights and obligations under existing international law.173  The Security Council
resolution called upon all concerned "to comply fully with their obligations under
international law including in particular the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the Hague
Regulations of 1907."'' 74 It further required the United States and United Kingdom,
consistent with the UN Charter and other relevant international law, "to promote the
welfare of the Iraqi people through the effective administration of the territory, including
injparticular working towards the restoration of conditions of security and stability...
This resolution, decided under UN Chapter VII, determined that the situation in
Iraq was a threat to international peace and security. It was the first official recognition
by the Council of the United States and United Kingdom's status as occupying powers.
As a result, the United States and United Kingdom were authorized by Resolution 1483
to restore the security and stability in Iraq, as long as they did so while adhering to the
1949 Geneva Conventions. The Fourth Geneva Convention provides the rights and
duties of an occupying power. 176 Of particular relevance is Article 27, which states:
172 UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR), May 22, 2003, 1483, S/Res/1483.
173 Id. Preambular Paragraph 14; see also Open Society Institute and United Nations Foundation,
Reconstruction of Iraq: A Guide to the Issues, May 30, 2003, at 3.
174 UNSCR 1483, supra note 172 at 5.
171 Id. at 4.
176 The Fourth Geneva Convention (Aug. 12, 1949).
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Protected persons ... shall at all times be humanely treated, and shall be
protected especially against all acts of violence or threats thereof ....
However, the Parties to the conflict may take such measures of control and
security in regard to protected persons as may be necessary as a result of
the war. 
177
Article 29 further expands on the occupying powers' responsibilities by stating that "[t]he
Party to the conflict in whose hands protected persons may be, is responsible for the
treatment accorded to them by its agents, irrespective of any individual responsibility
which may be incurred." 178 Furthermore, Article 43 of the 1907 Hague Regulations IV
requires the occupying power to "take all the measures in his power to restore, and
ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety ...."
These provisions balance two competing interests, the obligation to treat protected
persons humanely, and the occupying power's need to provide control and security,
which are lacking as a result of war. Combined with the authorization in Resolution
1483, it is arguable that the United States and United Kingdom, as occupying powers,
were authorized to carry out law enforcement activities in order to restore security and
stability in Iraq, as long as protected persons were treated humanely. Thereby, the first
criterion, regarding authorization to enforce the law, is satisfied.
The second issue is whether the use of white phosphorus in Fallujah complies
with the US interpretation of law enforcement. The United States considers law
enforcement to be separate from domestic riot control and its attendant RCA definition.
Domestic riot control is a subset of law enforcement, along with a number of other
possible scenarios. Of those listed by Ambassador Ledogar to the US Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, only one could potentially apply to the Fallujah incident, that being
counter-terrorist operations. However, from the facts it does not appear that Fallujah was
a situation of law enforcement involving counter-terrorist operations. Firstly, the means
and methods of the operation were inconsistent with the nature of law enforcement.
Although the objective of the assault involved freeing Fallujah of insurgents, it was not a
situation of counter-terrorism law enforcement. Rather, it was a military operation that
was more akin to a method of warfare. The official end of major combatant operations
does not mean that all subsequent military operations were law enforcement. It is the
nature of the assault that must be considered. In the case of Fallujah, the use of white
phosphorus smoke was inconsistent with the nature of law enforcement. How could the
situation be considered one of law enforcement when white phosphorus was fired at
suspected insurgent positions, only to be followed by rounds of conventional explosives?
From the accounts of the manner in which the "shake 'n' bake" missions were conducted,
the Marines appeared completely oblivious to the targets they were firing upon. The
United States cannot assert that only combatants were present in Fallujah just because
they had urged civilians to leave. The principles of humanitarian law in the Geneva
Conventions and customary law still required the United States to exercise the utmost
regard for civilian life. The United States should have expected that many civilians were
still in Fallujah during the assault. The mixture of civilians and combatants, and the way
in which white phosphorus was fired upon them, is completely inconsistent with the law
177 Id. at art. 27.
"8 Id. at art. 29.
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enforcement exception. The use of white phosphorous in Fallujah violates the purposes
and principles of the CWC, and the obligations the United States had as occupying power
under Resolution 1483 and the Geneva Conventions. Although the United States was
authorized to restore public order and safety, such measures could not involve the
indiscriminate killing of civilians. Furthermore, the killings were a violation of Articles
27 and 29 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, which require that civilians receive humane
treatment and protection from violence. The authorization from the Iraqi Interim
Government is irrelevant as such actions could never be authorized under the guise of law
enforcement.
Furthermore, the types and quantities of the white phosphorus were not consistent
with use for law enforcement purposes. Allegedly, white phosphorous was fired from
mortar positions some distance from the target. It was used, not as a smokescreen for US
Marines to evade enemy fire, but to force the enemy from their protected positions. The
fact that the military had such large quantities of white phosphorus munitions available at
its disposal may point to a pre-meditation on the part of the military as to the manner that
white phosphorus would be used. Law enforcement cannot use mortars and explosives to
restore public order.' 79 As such, the types and quantities of white phosphorus were
inconsistent with law enforcement purposes.
In summary, the use of white phosphorus smoke is use of a chemical weapon. It
was used as a method of warfare during military operations in Fallujah. The lawful use
of chemicals for law enforcement purposes does not apply in the Fallujah assault because
of the methods and means of the engagement. The United States has violated the CWC
by using a chemical weapon in Iraq.
V. INCENDIARY WEAPONS
A further arms control regime which was potentially violated in Fallujah is that
governing incendiary weapons. Although there is no outright prohibition against the use
of incendiary weapons, certain restrictions exist under treaty and customary law
regarding use against non-combatants. The following involves a discussion of the
relevant law, and the application to Fallujab.
A. Treaty Law
The 1980 Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain
Conventional Weapons which may be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have
Indiscriminate Effects was negotiated in Geneva between 51 states. 8 It opened for
signature on October 10, 1980 and entered into force in December 1983.181 It aims to
protect military troops from inhumane injuries and prevent non-combatants from
accidental death or injury caused by certain types of arms.182 The CCW is an umbrella
convention because it only contains general provisions. The substantive law on which
179 Chemical Weapons Convention at art II.
18o Arms Control Association, Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) at a Glance, Sept.
2005, at 1, http://www.armscontrol.org/factshccts/CCW.asp.
S Id. at 1.
182 Id. at 1.
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specific weapons are restricted and prohibited is found annexed to the Convention in a
number of protocols. Three protocols existed upon entry into force, each dealing with a
specific weapon, the relevant one being Protocol III which deals with incendiary
weapons. The CCW required states to consent to a minimum of two of the three
protocols. The Convention was initially designed to deal only with international armed
conflicts. However, with the rise of non-international armed conflicts throughout much
of the early 1990s, an amendment was made to a single protocol in 1996 making it
applicable to internal armed conflict. This was extended in 2001 to apply to the entire
Convention. Unlike the Chemical Weapons Convention, the CCW has no verification
mechanism and consequently relies upon states to individually verify and enforce its
provisions, which weakens its authority. The United States signed the CCW on April 8,
1982. However it was not until March 24, 1995 that it ratified Protocols I and II. To
date, the United States has not ratified Protocol III.
1. Protocol III
Protocol III of the CCW is of particular importance to the present
discussion. The Protocol contains two articles. Article I provides important
definitions. Of particular relevance is the definition of an incendiary weapon, as
"any weapon or munition which is primarily designed to set fire to objects or to
cause bum injury to persons through the action of flame, heat, or a combination
thereof, produced by a chemical reaction of a substance delivered on the
target." '83 Examples in the Convention of the form that such weapons can take
include flamethrowers, fougasses, shells, rockets, grenades, mines, bombs and
other containers of incendiary substances. 184 The Convention expressly excludes
a number of substances from falling under the incendiary weapons definition:
(i) Munitions which may have incidental incendiary effects, such as
illuminants, tracers, smoke or signaling systems;
(ii) Munitions designed to combine penetration, blast or fragmentation
effects with an additional incendiary effect, such as armour-piercing
projectiles, fragmentation shells, explosive bombs and similar combined-
effects munitions in which the incendiary effect is not specifically
designed to cause burn injury to persons, but to be used against military
objectives, such as armoured vehicles, aircraft and installations or
facilities. 185
Therefore, for a weapon to be considered an incendiary weapon, it must intentionally set
fire or burn. If it only ignites fire or burns as a side effect, it is not an incendiary weapon
under the Protocol. 1W
183 Convention on Conventional Weapons, Protocol I1, art. 1 (I).
11
4 Id. at art. I(l)(a).
181 Id. at art. l(l)(b).
186 Arms Control Association, supra note 180 at 1.
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Article II spells out the substantive prohibitions. The main aim of this Article is
to protect the civilian population in the vicinity of the conflict zone from being targeted,
and suffering from the effects of the attack. It includes three main prohibitions. First,
under Article 2(1), it is prohibited in all circumstances "to make the civilian population as
such, individual civilians or civilian objects the object of attack by incendiary
weapons." 187 This prohibition mirrors more general bans on targeting civilians under
Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions and under customary international law.
Second, Article 2(2) prohibits in all circumstances "to make any military
objective located within a concentration of civilians the object of attack by air-delivered
incendiary weapons." 188 This broad prohibition against attacking a military object' 89
within a civilian concentration1 90 with air-delivered incendiary weapons has been
criticized for being too restrictive. It could potentially immunize a military objective
from attack by air-delivered incendiary weapons, in a situation where such weapons may
be the only appropriate means of attack.19'
Third, Article 2(3) prohibits making:
any military objective located within a concentration of civilians the object
of attack by means of incendiary weapons other than air-delivered
incendiary weapons, except when such military objective is clearly
separated from the concentration of civilians and all feasible precautions
are taken with a view to limiting the incendiary effects to the military
objective and to avoiding, and in any event to minimizing, incidental loss
of civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects.
92
Whereas Article 2(2) prohibits the use of air-delivered incendiary weapons
against a military target within a concentration of civilians, Article 2(3) applies to non-air
delivered incendiary weapons and provides restrictions on their use. There are two
requirements for the use of incendiary weapons to be permitted: first, the military object
must be clearly separated from the concentration of civilians and second, all feasible
precautions' 93 must be taken to limit the incendiary effects to the military objects in order
to minimize loss of or injury to civilian life and objects. This is a pragmatic provision
which acknowledges that incendiary weapons do provide utility to the military and may
in fact cause less civilian death and injury than other conventional bombs and munitions.
187 Convention on Conventional Weapons, Protocol Ill, art. 2(l).
'g Convention on Conventional Weapons, Protocol 111, art. 2(2).
89 Article 1(3) of the Protocol defines "military object" as "any object which by its nature, location,
purpose or use makes an effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction,
capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage."
190 Article 1(2) of the Protocol defines "concentration of civilians" as "any concentration of civilians, be it
permanent or temporary, such as in inhabited parts of cities, or inhabited towns or villages, or as in camps
or columns of refugees or evacuees, or groups of nomads."
191 Howard S. Levie, Prohibitions and Restrictions on the Use of Conventional Weapons, 68 ST. JOHN'S L.
REv. 643,664(1994).
192 Convention on Conventional Weapons, Protocol 1II, art. 2(3).
193 Article 1(5) defines "feasible precautions" as "those precautions which are practicable or practically
possible taking into account all circumstances ruling at the time, including humanitarian and military
considerations."
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From these provisions, it is clear that the Protocol permits the use of incendiary
weapons against combatants. The Protocol only offers some limited protections to
civilians, restricting incendiary weapon use in such a manner that civilians are not
harmed. It still permits the use of non-air-delivered incendiaries if all feasible measures
were taken not to harm civilians or civilian objects. Civilians may not be the object of an
attack, and if military targets are located in their vicinity, no air delivered incendiaries
may be used.
2. US Position Towards Protocol III
As mentioned above, the United States has not signed or ratified Protocol III.
President Clinton, upon submitting the Convention to the US Senate for approval in
1994, recommended that the United States exercise its right to ratify the Convention,
accepting only the first two protocols and not Protocol III. He stated that Protocol III was
not sent to the Senate "because of concerns about the acceptability of the Protocol from a
military point of view. Incendiary weapons have significant military value, particularly
with respect to flammable military targets that cannot so readily be destroyed with
conventional explosives."'194  However, even though incendiary weapons have such
utility, President Clinton reaffirmed that, "the United States must retain its ability to
employ incendiaries to hold high priority military targets such as those at risk in a manner
consistent with the principle of proportionality which governs the use of all weapons
under existing law."'
195
President Clinton proposed the inclusion of a reservation to the Protocol, which
would balance the US national security interests with those of international humanitarian
law. The proposed reservation would reserve the right to use incendiaries against
military objectives located in concentrations of civilians where it is judged that such use
would cause fewer casualties and less collateral damage than alternative weapons.
96
Such a reservation would remove the requirement that civilian and military objects be
clearly separated and that all feasible precautions were taken to minimize loss or injury to
civilians. If implemented, this amounts to a revision of the legal obligations of Article 2
of the Protocol on the United States so that the test of whether the use of an incendiary
weapon is permitted in such circumstances would depend on whether it is judged that
such use would cause fewer civilian casualties and less collateral damage than alternative
weapons. 97 As Protocol III was never submitted for Senate ratification, this reservation
was never implemented.
An analysis conducted by the US Department of Defense's Office for Acquisition,
Technology and Logistics regarding the acceptability of incendiary weapons from a
military standpoint made the following conclusion:
194 Protocols to the 1980 Conventional Weapons Convention, Jan. 7, 1997, S. Treaty Doc. No. 105-1, 1997
WL 49691 (Treaty) (Message from the US President transmitting Protocols II, III, and IV to the CCW to
the Senate).
1
95 Id.
196 Id.
'9' US Department of Defense, CCW: Article by Article Analysis of the Protocol on Use of Incendiary
Weapons, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics,
www.defenselink.mil/acq/acic/treaties/ccwaplartbyart_pro3 .htm.
2007]
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2007
JOURNAL OF LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE
Incendiary weapons have significant potential military value, particularly
with respect to certain high-priority military targets. Incendiaries are the
only weapons which can effectively destroy certain counter-proliferation
targets such as biological weapons facilities which require high heat to
eliminate bio-toxins. To use only high explosives would risk the
widespread release of dangerous contaminants with potentially disastrous
consequences for the civilian population. Certain flammable military
targets are also more readily destroyed by incendiaries. For example, a
fuel depot could require up to eight times the bombs and sorties to destroy
using only high explosives rather than incendiaries. Such an increase
means a significantly greater humanitarian risk of collateral damage. The
United States must retain its ability to employ incendiaries to hold high
priority military targets such as these at risk in a manner consistent with
the principle of proportionality which governs the use of all weapons
under existing law.19F
As the United States is not a party to Protocol III, it is not bound by the various
provisions it provides. The United States maintains the utility of incendiary weapons for
military purposes and reserves its right to use them.
B. Customary International Law
The United States may, however, still be bound by a number of restrictions that
exist in customary international law. The ICRC, in its study of customary international
humanitarian law, identifies two primary rules in particular. The first regulates the use of
incendiary weapons in situations where civilians may be affected. The second governs
the use of incendiary weapons against combatants.1 99 Both are discussed below.
1. Incendiary Use and Civilians
One customary norm identified by the ICRC is Rule 84: "If incendiary weapons
are used, particular care must be taken to avoid, and in any event to minimize, incidental
loss to civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects. '00
There are a number of similarities between this rule and Article 2(1) of Protocol
III of the CCW, each of which prohibit the targeting of civilians and civilian objects for
attack by incendiary weapons. Both appear to give protection to civilians, however
Protocol III Article 2(1) creates a more encompassing prohibition (prohibiting in all
circumstances) compared to the prohibition contained in Rule 84 (particular care must be
taken to avoid, and minimize). Although making civilians the object of attack would
constitute a violation of both Rule 84 and Article 2(1), Rule 84 seems to allow incendiary
weapon use against a military target in a concentration of civilians as long as care was
198 id.
"' INTERNATIONAL COMMI'rEE OF THE RED CROSS, STUDY ON CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAW: A CONTRIBUTION TO THE UNDERSTANDING AND RESPECT FOR THE RULE OF LAW IN
ARMED CONFLICT Rule 84-85 (Mar. 2005) (hereinafter "ICRC Study").
200 Id. at Rule 84.
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taken to avoid or minimize incidental loss to civilian life, injury and so forth. The ICRC
states that even though Article 2(1) is more forceful than the customary Rule 84, the
former is also part of customary law as it is a direct application of the principle of
distinction. 201 According to the ICRC, the other three paragraphs in Article II do not
have customary force. 202  However, they could be considered guidelines for the
implementation of the customary rule that particular care must be taken to avoid civilian
casualties.
20 3
The evidence the ICRC study provides to support the foundation of Rule 84 is
found in a number of state documents, military manuals and statements. First, many
military manuals when providing the rules for incendiary weapons use refer either
directly to the rules in Protocol Ill,204 or state the requirement to avoid, or at least
205minimize, civilian casualties. An overwhelming proportion of the military manuals
make specific reference to the need to safeguard civilian lives during incendiary weapon
use. A large proportion also forbids the use of incendiary weapons against a military
objective situated within a civilian population center,20 6 or where it cannot be clearly
separated from the civilian population.
2 07
In addition, under the national legislation of a number of countries, the use of
incendiary weapons is forbidden where the military objective cannot be clearly separated
from the civilian population, civilian objects or the surrounding environment. Estonia
and Hungary even consider widespread use of incendiary weapons in such a situation to
amount to a war crime.
20 9
The United States has contributed to the development of customary international
law on this issue. However, its legislation and military manuals provide less restrictive
rules on incendiary weapon use. The USAir Force Pamphlet states that:
The potential of fire to spread beyond the immediate target area has also
raised concerns about uncontrollable or indiscriminate effects affecting the
civilian population or civilian objects. Accordingly, any applicable rules
of engagement relating to incendiary weapons must be followed closely to
avoid controversy. The manner in which incendiary weapons are
employed is also regulated by the other principles and rules regulating
armed force .... In particular, the potential capacity of fire to spread
must be considered in relation to the rules protecting civilians and civilian
201 Henckaerts & Doswald-Beck, supra note 116 at 288.
202 Id. at 288.203 Id. at 288.
204 See New Zealand, MILITARY MANUAL 513, 620 (1992); Canada, LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT MANUAL
1 33,34,36 (1999); Germany, MILITARY MANUAL d 420-425 (1992); Russia, MILITARY MANUAL 6(h)
(1990); Sweden, INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW MANUAL § 3.3.2 (1991).
205 Henckaerts & Doswald-Beck, supra note 116 at 288. For military manuals with such a reference, see
Cameroon, INSTRUCTOR'S MANUAL 123-124 441 (1992); Ecuador, NAVAL MANUAL 9.6 (1989); France,
LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT MANUAL 54 (2001); Israel, MANUAL ON THE LAWS OF WAR 16 (1998);
Switzerland, BASIC MILITARY MANUAL art. 23(d) (1987).
206 See Israel, MANUAL ON THE LAWS OF WAR 16 (1998); Germany, MILITARY MANUAL 420-425 (1992).207 See Argentina, LAW OF WAR MANUAL 4.25, 4.26 (1989); Netherlands, MILITARY MANUAL V-13 at
11 (1993).
208 Penal Code (2001), s. 103 (Est.) available at www.legaltext.ee/en!andmebaas/ava.asp?m=022.
209 Id.; Penal Code as Amended (1978), Section 160/A(3)(b)(3) (Hung.).
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objects .... For example, incendiary weapons should be avoided in urban
areas, to the extent that other weapons are available and as effective.
210
The US Naval Handbook states the following:
Incendiary devices such as tracer ammunition, thermite bombs, flame
throwers, napalm, and other incendiary weapons and agents, are lawful
weapons. Where incendiary devices are the weapons of choice, they
should be employed in a manner that does not cause incidental injury or
collateral damage that is excessive in light of the military advantage
anticipated by the attack.2 11
Neither of these statements provides a prohibition on the use of incendiary
weapons in areas of civilian concentration. Although the statement from the US Air
Force Pamphlet does recommend avoiding incendiary weapons use in urban areas, the
usage of the phrase "should be avoided" would allow their use in certain circumstances
where the commander deems it necessary. The same could be said regarding the US
Naval Handbook statement which, although stating that incendiary weapons should not
be used in a manner which causes excessive incidental injury or collateral damage,
permits their use if the military advantage anticipated outweighs the costs to civilians.
Such guidance provides extensive room for interpretation.
During negotiations for Protocol III of the CCW, a number of proposals were
made to establish the limits of the situations in which incendiary weapons could be used.
At the CCW Preparatory Conference in 1979, the United States stated that although it
could not accept a restriction on the use of incendiary weapons against combatants, "an
agreement on limiting the use of incendiaries in areas containing civilian concentrations
was appropriate and possible . . . . The [Australia/Netherlands] proposal was the
maximum that some of the principal interested parties at the Conference would be
prepared to accept.,
21 2
Considering the US position, it is important to ascertain the Australian and
Netherlands proposals in order to establish what the United States considered to be the
maximum restrictions on the use of incendiary weapons in areas containing civilian
concentrations.
After a number of draft proposals and revisions, Australia and the Netherlands
submitted a draft proposal in 1979 stating that "as a consequence of the rules of
international law applicable with respect to the protection of civilians against the effects
of hostilities, it is prohibited to make the civilian population as such as well as individual
civilians the object of attack by means of incendiary munitions." 213  Furthermore,
incendiary weapons used against military objectives in civilian concentrations were not
prohibited, "provided the attack is otherwise lawful and that all feasible precautions are
"('US AIR FORCE PAMPHLET 6-6(c) (1976).
211 US NAVAL HANDBOOK 9.7 (1995).
212 US, Statement at the CCW Preparatory Conference, UN Doc. A/CONF.95/PREP.CONF/II/SR.23 at 2-3
5-6, (Apr. 6, 1979).
213 Australia & Netherlands, Draft proposal on incendiary weapons submitted to the CCW Preparatory
Conference, UN Doc. A/CONF.95/PREP.CONF./L. 15, (Apr. 5, 1979).
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taken to limit the incendiary effects to the military objective and to avoid incidental loss
of civilian life and injury to civilians."
214
These statements show what the United States considers to be the maximum limit
of the law on incendiary weapon use in civilian concentrations. A summary of the above
law would be as follows:
1. It is prohibited to make civilians the object of attack by means of
incendiary weapons.
2. Military objectives in civilian concentrations may be the object of
attack only if:
a. all feasible precautions are taken to limit the incendiary
effects to the military objective; and,
b. to avoid incidental loss of civilian life and injury to
civilians.
a. Principle of distinction
What may further bind the United States are the rules in the Additional Protocol I
to the Geneva Conventions (many of which have attained customary status). Despite the
United States not being a state party to the Protocol, many of these rules are codifications
of customary international law. The Protocol obliges respect for the principle of
distinction. The basic rule upholding this is Article 48, which requires parties to a
conflict at all times to distinguish between the civilian population and combatants and to
direct their operations only against military objectives. 215 Therefore, civilians may never
be made the object of an attack. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) upheld the
principle of distinction as being one of the "cardinal principles" of the law of armed
conflict and one of the "intransgressible principles of international customary law.
216
Article 51 of Protocol I states that civilians '1 shall not be the object of attack and shall
enjoy general protection against dangers arising from military operations. 21 9 Article 51
codifies a principle of customary international law prohibiting indiscriminate attacks
against civilians. 0 Indiscriminate attacks are defined as:
(a) those which are not directed at a specific military objective;
(b) those which employ a method or means of combat which cannot be
directed at a specific military objective; or
214 
id.
2'5 Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions of 12 Aug. 1949 (Protocol I), Article 48.
216 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1996.217 Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions of 12 Aug. 1949 (Protocol 1), Article 50 states that
civilians are all those who are not part of the armed forces as defined in Article 43 of Additional Protocol I,
as well as those not directly linked to the armed forces, released prisoners of war, those employed in the
production, distribution and storage of munitions of war, and those taking or have taken part in hostilities
without combatant status. See MICHAEL BOTHE, KARL JOSEPH PARTSCH & WALDEMAR A. SOLF, NEW
RULES FOR VICTIMS OF ARMED CONFLICT 293-294 (1982).
2 8 Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions of 12 Aug. 1949 (Protocol I), art. 51(2).
219 Id. at art. 51(1).
220 Henckaerts & Doswald-Beck, supra note 116; Rule 11 at 37-40.
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(c) those which employ a method or means of combat the effects of which
cannot be limited as required by this Protocol.22'
This definition has been considered part of customary international law and is included in
a large number of national military manuals. 222 Furthermore, states not party to the
Protocol, including the United States, have relied on this definition. 223 Article 54(4)(c)
relates to weapons whose effect cannot be limited in accordance with international
224humanitarian law. By definition, such an attack is an indiscriminate attack. The ICRC
points to practices which illustrate that such limits refer to weapons whose effects are
uncontrollable in time and space and are likely to strike military objectives and civilians
without distinction.225  Incendiary weapons and biological weapons would fit this
description.
226
In addition, Article 51(5) provides two examples of what would constitute an
indiscriminate attack. The most relevant example is found in subsection (5)(b) and states
there is an indiscriminate attack where, "an attack which may be expected to cause
incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a
combination thereof, [and] which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and
direct military advantage anticipated. 27 This rule encapsulates the principle of
proportionality where a balance is struck between the military necessity for eliminating a
military object and avoiding incidental or collateral civilian casualties. 28 Notably, it has
also been considered part of customary international law. The information available to
the commander at the time of the attack must be taken into account, not that available in
hindsight.
229
Precautions must be made when launching military attacks, including the
requirement of constant care to spare the civilian population. 230 This principle links back
to the basic rule in Article 48 requiring that military objects and civilians be
distinguished. Article 57 lists a number of precautionary rules including: the verification
of the identity of the object of attack as a military objective, the application of the
principle of proportionality in situations when attacks against military objectives may be
expected to cause collateral civilian casualties or damage to civilian objects, and the
choice of methods or means of inflicting injury on the enemy with the view of selecting
that which poses the least danger to the civilian population. 23 The ICRC considers these
precautionary rules to be part of customary international law.232
2. Incendiary Use and Combatants
2 Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions of 12 Aug. 1949 (Protocol 1), art. 51(4).
222 Henckaerts & Doswald-Beck, supra note 116 at 41.
223 id.
224 Bothe, Partsch & Solf, supra note 217 at 306.
225 Henckaerts & Doswald-Beck, supra note 116 at 43.
226 Bothe, Partsch & Soilf, supra note 217 at 305.
227 Additional Protocol I, art. 51(5)(b).
22' Bothe, Partsch & Solf, supra note 217 at 310.
21 /d. at 310.
23O Additional Protocol I, art. 57(l).
231 Id. at 57(2); see also Bothe, Partsch & Sol, supra note 217 at 359.
232 Henckaerts & Doswald-Beck, supra note 116 (stating Rules 15-18, 51-60).
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The second norm identified by the ICRC regulating the use of incendiary weapons
is as follows: "[t]he anti-personnel use of incendiary weapons is prohibited, unless it is
not feasible to use a less harmful weapon to render a person hors de combat.,
233
The ICRC stated that in the initial discussions and negotiations, a number of states
were pushing for a.complete ban on incendiary use against combatants. However, it soon
became clear that the Protocol would not receive widespread support if such a broad
prohibition were included. As such, a fallback position was posited which would have
prohibited incendiary use against combatants except when they were under armored
protection or in field fortifications. This pragmatic proposal attempted to balance the
military necessity of incendiary weapons against the ideal of humanizing the battlefield.
However, even this position received opposition, most notably from the United States and
the United Kingdom. As a result, no prohibition against incendiary weapon use on
combatants was included in the Protocol.
According to the ICRC, despite such prohibitions not being included, it did not
mean that the use of incendiary weapons against combatants was lawful in all
234circumstances. There is a broad spectrum within the various national positions on
incendiary weapon use on combatants. They range from the restriction that incendiaries
may only be used when combatants are under armored protections or in field
fortifications, 235 to the prohibition of incendiary weapons when causing unnecessary
suffering, to the complete prohibition because it always causes unnecessary
suffering.
237
The US position on this issue is articulated in the US Field Manual, which states
that, "[t]he use of weapons which employ fire, such as tracer flame-throwers, napalm and
other incendiary agents, against targets requiring their use is not a violation of
international law. They should not, however, be employed in such a way as to cause
unnecessary suffering to individuals., 238  In addition, the US Air Force Pamphlet
similarly states that "[i]ncendiary weapons ... have widespread uses in armed conflict.
Although evoking intense international concern, combined with attempts to ban their use,
state practice indicates clearly they are regarded as lawful in situations requiring their
use.... [I]ncendiary weapons must not be used so as to cause unnecessary suffering."
239
With the various statements from the United States and other states, the ICRC
concludes that a customary rule has developed prohibiting incendiary weapons use
against combatants if such use would cause unnecessary sufferin , e.g., if it is feasible to
use a less harmful weapon to render a combatant hors de combat. 
4
233 ICRC Study at Rule 85
234 Henckaerts & Doswald-Beck, supra note 116 at 290.
235 Proposals Submitted to the Preparatory Conference for the CCW by Austria, Denmark, Egypt, Ghana,
Indonesia, Jamaica, Mexico, Norway, Romania, Sweden, Venezuela, Yugoslavia and Zaire; See also
Henckaerts & Doswald-Beck, supra note 116 at 290.
236 Military Manuals of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, United Kingdom, and the United States. See also
ICRC Study at Rule 290.
237 Military Manuals of Belgium, Colombia, and Sweden; Statements of Norway and the USSR to the
Preparatory Conference for the CCW; lenckaerts & Doswald-Beck, supra note 116 at 290.
238 US FIELD MANUAL 36 (1956).
239 US AIR FORCE PAMPHLET, supra note 210 at I 6-6(c).
24o Henckaerts & Doswald-Beck, supra note 116 at 291.
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a. Unnecessary Suffering
The determining factor for the above rule is whether the use of incendiary
weapons caused unnecessary suffering. The prohibition against this exists in both treaty
and customary law. Article 35 of the 1977 Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva
Conventions states: "1. In any armed conflict, the right of the Parties to the conflict to
choose methods or means of warfare is not unlimited. 2. It is prohibited to employ
weapons, projectiles and material and methods of warfare of a nature to cause
superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering."
The ICRC has included this prohibition in its study of customary international
humanitarian law. Rule 70 states, "[t]he use of means and methods of warfare which are
of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering is prohibited., 24 1
Importantly, the International Court of Justice in the Nuclear Weapons Advisory
Opinion242 held that the rule prohibiting unnecessary suffering to combatants was a
cardinal principle and that this outlawed certain weapons irrespective of whether they
were specifically prohibited by treaty or not.
243
The two quoted paragraphs of Article 35 must be read together. Paragraph 1
provides a general prohibition, whereas paragraph 2 specifies an implementing rule
derived from the principles in paragraph 1. According to Bothe, Partsch and Solf, the
prohibition in paragraph I contains two limitations on the choice of methods and means
or warfare. These include such rules as prohibiting poisoned weapons, the use of
weapons and methods of warfare of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary
suffering, perfidious killing, wounding, or capturing of enemy combatants and attacks on
civilians.2 4 The second layer of limitations provides the two complementary principles
that are the foundations for the international humanitarian law: necessity and humanity.
Necessity justifies those measures of military violence not forbidden by international law
which are relevant and proportionate to securing the prompt submission of the enemy
with the least possible expenditure of economic or human resources.245 Balancing this,
humanity forbids those measures of violence that are not necessary (that is, relevant and
proportionate) to the achievement of a definite military advantage. 246 Applying this
limitation to the rule in Paragraph 2, the balance is between necessity, on the one hand,
and the expected injury or suffering inflicted on the person on the other.247 The test
becomes whether the suffering is needless, superfluous, or manifestly disproportionate to
the military advantage reasonably expected from the use of the weapon. 24 ' TheInternational Court of Justice defined unnecessary suffering as harm greater than that
24 1 Henckaerts & Doswald-Beck, supra note 116 at 237.
242 Advisory Opinion, Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. 95 (July 8) available
at http://www.icj-cij. org/icj www/icases/iunan/iunanframe.htm.
243 JUDITH GARDAM, NECESSITY, PROPORTIONALITY AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 72 (2004).
2" Bothe, Partsch & Solf, supra note 217 at 194.
245 Id. at 194-95.
246 Id. at 195.
247 Henckaerts & Doswald-Beck, supra note 116 at 240.
248 Bothe, Partsch, & Solf, supra note 217 at 196.
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unavoidable to achieve legitimate military objectives. '2 49 An additional consideration is
whether alternative means can be used to achieve the same military objective.
The term "suffering" has proven difficult to define. Generally speaking, suffering
is considered to include both the physical and psychological effects of weapons, the long-
term nature of the injuries, the painfulness or severity of the wounds, mortality rates and
the treatment available in conflict situations. 250 The ICRC study created a list of methods
and means of warfare that could be considered to create unnecessary suffering, which
included among others incendiary weapons. 1 There was not, however, sufficient
agreement to establish that they were prohibited.
C. Application to Fallujah
A number of questions must be answered in order to ascertain whether the United
States violated international law regarding use of an incendiary weapon in Fallujah.
First, is white phosphorus used in this manner considered an incendiary weapon?
Second, irrespective of not being a state party to Protocol III, did the US actions comply
with the treaty's requirements? Third, did the United States adhere to the rules of
customary international law regarding incendiary weapon use? These three questions
will be discussed in turn.
First, according to Protocol III, for a substance to be an incendiary weapon, it
must be "[p]rimarily designed to cause burn injury to persons through the action of flame,
heat or combination thereof .... " Burning white phosphorus particles is an incendiary
weapon. Upon contact with exposed skin or mucus membranes, it causes burn injuries
through the action of heat and flame. Its employment was not as its other purpose of a
smokescreen, but rather its use involved an intention to exploit its incendiary qualities.
Furthermore, the substance must not be expressly excluded as a weapon with incidental
incendiary effects under Article I(l)(b) of the Protocol. The "shake 'n' bake" missions
were not using the incendiary qualities of white phosphorus as an incidental effect.
Rather, those qualities were the primary purpose of their use. Therefore, white
phosphorus is not excluded from the definition, and is considered an incendiary weapon
under the Protocol.
Second, although not being bound by the provision of Protocol III, did the United
States comply with its requirements? There are three prohibitions relevant to the present
discussion. The first is whether civilians were made the object of the attack, as
prohibited by Article 2(1) and customary law. The evidence does not support such a
conclusion. By all accounts the objects of attack for the US forces were the suspected
insurgents, not the civilians. The second prohibition in Article 2 bans the use of air-
delivered incendiary weapons against military objectives located in a concentration of
civilians. Again, there is no evidence suggesting that the United States fired white
phosphorus from air-delivered systems. The accounts relied upon refer to US forces
firing white phosphorus from mortars. The third prohibition bans attacking military
objectives located in a concentration of civilians with non-air-delivered mechanisms
unless the civilians are clearly separated from the military object and all feasible
249 Henckaerts & Doswald-Beck, supra note 116 at 238.
250 Gardam, supra note 243 at 72; Bothe, Partsch & Solf, supra note 217 at 196.
2-1 Henckaerts & Doswald-Beck, supra note 116 at 244.
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precautions are taken to limit incendiary effects to the military objective, thereby
minimizing incidental loss or injury of civilians. From the accounts, it appears that this
provision has been violated. The US forces fired white phosphorus from ground
delivered systems without knowing what target they were hitting. During the assault, US
Marines reported a significant civilian presence in Fallujah. Judging from the nature of
urban warfare, it is unlikely that they were clearly separated from the military objectives.
It is likely that there was no intention of killing or injuring civilians through such actions.
However, the use of an incendiary weapon in an urban combat situation where civilians
were still clearly present is a violation of Article 2(3). In addition, as the US government
has not released information regarding its operational handling of the Fallujah assault, it
is unclear what precautions were taken by US commanders to limit the effects of white
phosphorus on combatants. Nonetheless, the method of deployment, the indiscriminate
nature of the agent, and the urban setting, do not support the view that all feasible
precautions were undertaken. According to the Protocol, feasible precautions include all
those practicable or practically possible taking into account all circumstances ruling at the
time. Further precautions should have been undertaken to confirm the military nature
of the target. Since the United States is not party to Protocol III and Article 2(3) is not
part of customary law, this provision only has the status of a non-binding guideline, and
its violation will have no real consequences for the United States.
Customary law, however, binds the United States and evidence suggests that
violations of this law occurred. First, the United States breached the customary norm that
particular care must be taken to avoid and minimize incidental loss or injury to civilians.
Although mirroring Article 2(3) above, this law is more lenient and allows some
collateral damage provided all feasible precautions are taken to avoid or minimize it. As
mentioned above, there is no evidence that feasible precautions were taken during the
"shake 'n' bake" missions. The method of white phosphorus use shows an utter lack of
precautionary measures as those being fired upon could have been (and many cases were)
civilians. The reports also suggest that white phosphorus did injure and kill civilians.
Furthermore, the principle of distinction outlaws any indiscriminate attacks against
civilians. The use of white phosphorus involved a method and means of combat the
effects of which cannot be limited as required by Protocol 1.253 Furthermore, due to the
urban setting, the attacks could be expected to cause incidental loss and injury to
civilians. Such assaults were excessive to the concrete and direct military advantage as it
involved firing an incendiary weapon in a setting where civilians and combatants were
mixed in the hope that those fleeing were insurgents. This amounts to a violation of the
principles of proportionality and distinction. The United States also violated its own
military manuals which required that if other more effective weapons causing less
suffering were available, such should be used in place of incendiaries. A statement in the
Field Artillery article suggests that other weapons were available, but that they were used
only to save the white phosphorus for lethal missions. 4 This shows the intent for which
white phosphorus was exploited. Any commander would have been aware of the
inherent risks of such actions to the civilian population.
252 Protocol 111, art. 1(5).
253 Additional Protocol I, art. 54(4)(c).
254 James T. Cobb, Christopher A. LaCour & William H. Hight, TF 2-2 in FSE AAR: Indirect Fires in the
Battle of Fallujah, FIELD ARTILLERY, March-April, 2005, at 23.
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The same consideration regarding choice of a less harmful weapon is central to
the customary rule that the anti-personnel use of an incendiary weapon is prohibited,
unless it is not feasible to use a less harmful weapon to render a person hors de combat.
Injury and death by white phosphorus would involve unnecessary and superfluous
suffering. The law allows the killing of combatants with incendiaries only if other, less
harmful weapons are not available. As mentioned earlier, other weapons were allegedly
available; however, such a determination remains for the commander on the field to
make. With little battle information in the public domain, it is out of the scope of this
paper to analyze this issue. If it were found that other weapons and tactics could have
been used, it would only further indict the US forces for their actions in Fallujah.
In summary, the evidence suggests that the United States violated its customary
obligations to protect the civilian population. It used an indiscriminate weapon in an
environment where civilians and combatants were mixed, thereby violating its
obligations under the law of armed conflict. More facts are required to ascertain whether
the use against combatants was unlawful.
VI. CONCLUSION
The use of white phosphorus in Fallujah was in violation of a number of
international treaties and customary obligations binding upon the US armed forces. The
white phosphorus smoke was used in a manner inconsistent with the US obligations
under the CWC, being used as a precursor chemical and as a riot control agent as a
method of warfare. It thus amounted to the use of a chemical weapon. There is some
irony in this conclusion considering that Iraq never used chemical weapons against the
United States despite the overly touted allegations that Saddam Hussein had chemical and
biological weapon stockpiles. The United States also violated its obligations under the
customary rules regarding the use of an indiscriminate incendiary weapon in a mixed
civilians and combatant setting. Different weapons and tactics should have been used to
avoid civilian casualties and the violation of international law of armed conflict.
However, the expected consequences for the US forces are minimal. The US government
must prosecute the perpetrators under its code of military justice. It is unlikely that any
action will be taken internationally by other states or relevant international organizations
on this issue due to the highly politically charged nature of the Iraq war and the secret
nature of the US military's methods and means of warfare. Changes to the US rules of
engagement and military manuals, as well as better training for its soldiers, would be the
most effective way to avert future violations.
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